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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the innovative work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), behavioral finance 
has become one of the most active areas in financial economics. As compared to 
traditional models in this area, behavioral models often have the degree of flexibility 
that permits reinterpretation to fit new facts. Unfortunately, this flexibility makes it hard 
either to disprove or to validate behavioral models. In the present thesis we try to 
overcome this problem, by proposing a general framework based on stylized facts of 
human behavior (invariants); and applying it to three financial contexts. Related to the 
individual risk taking decision, we focus: on the role of incentives; on how prior 
outcomes influence future decision; and on the portfolio choice problem. Different from 
traditional models where risk aversion is usually assumed, in our behavioral framework, 
the risk preference of the investor varies depending on how he frames his choices. Our 
main conclusion is that absolute evaluations based on final wealth are limited and the 
relativity of risk taking decisions, where the perception of gains and losses drives the 
process, is a requirement to understand individual’s decisions. As a reply to behavioral 
critics, we reach propositions that can be falsified and make several predictions.  
Summing up, under the same theoretical framework we make the following 
contributions: (1) Shed more light on how incentives affect risk taking behavior, 
proposing a model where the reference plays a central role in the previous relationship; 
(2) Empirically test our incentives model considering a comprehensive world sample of 
equity funds (cross-section data); (3) Evaluate which effect is stronger in multi-period 
risk taking decisions for individual investors: house-money or disposition effect, 
proposing a novel experiment treatment; (4) Compare survey to experimental results 
finding that they are not necessarily aligned. (5) Generalize the myopic loss aversion 
behavior performing an experiment in Brazil and Spain; (6) Propose a theoretical model 
of how behavioral individuals choose their portfolios in terms of risk taking behavior; 
(7) Include estimation error in the behavioral portfolio analysis; (8) Evaluate whether 
theoretical models of portfolio choice should adapt or moderate the individual behavior 
characteristics. In this case we used a sample of several country equity indices.  
Our propositions suggest that managers in passive managed funds tend to be 
rewarded without incentive fee and be risk averse. On the other hand, in active managed 
funds, whether incentives will reduce or increase the riskiness of the fund will depend 
on how hard it is to outperform the benchmark. If the fund is (un)likely to outperform 
the benchmark, incentives (increase) reduce the manager’s risk appetite. Furthermore, 
the evaluative horizon influences the trader’s risk preferences, in the sense that if traders 
performed poorly (well) in a period, they tend to choose riskier (conservative) 
investments in the following period given the same evaluative horizon. Empirical 
evidence, based on a comprehensive world sample of mutual funds is also presented in 
this chapter and gives support to the previous propositions. Related to the house-money 
and disposition effect, we employ a survey approach and find evidence of house money 
effect. However, in an experiment performed in a dynamic financial setting, we show 
that the house money effect disappears, and that disposition is the dominant effect. We 
report supportive results related to existence of myopic loss aversion across countries 
and some evidence of country effect. Finally, in terms of asset allocation, our results 
support the use of our behavioral model (BRATE) as an alternative for defining optimal 
asset allocation and posit that a portfolio optimization model may be adapted to the 
individual biases implied by prospect theory without efficiency loss. We also explain 
why investors keep on holding, or even buy, loosing investments. 
 
RESUMEN 
 
Desde el trabajo innovador de Kahneman y de Tversky (1979), las finanzas del 
comportamiento se han convertido en una de las áreas más activas en la economía 
financiera. Comparados con los modelos tradicionales en esta área, los modelos del 
comportamiento tienen a menudo el grado de flexibilidad que permite su 
reinterpretación, ajustándoles a nuevos hechos empíricos. Desafortunadamente, esta 
flexibilidad hace difícil refutar o validar modelos del comportamiento. En la actual tesis 
intentamos superar este problema, proponiendo un marco general basado en hechos 
estilizados del comportamiento humano (invariables); y aplicándolo a tres contextos 
financieros. Relacionado con la decisión individual de toma de riesgo, nos enfocamos: 
en el papel de los incentivos financieros; en cómo los resultados anteriores influencian 
la decisión futura; y en el problema de la gerencia de cartera. Diferente de los modelos 
tradicionales donde la aversión al riesgo se asume generalmente, en nuestro marco del 
comportamiento, la preferencia del riesgo del inversionista varía dependiendo de cómo 
él enmarca sus opciones. Nuestra conclusión principal es que las evaluaciones absolutas 
basadas en la riqueza final son limitadas y la relatividad de las decisiones de riesgo, 
donde la percepción de las ganancias y de las pérdidas conduce el proceso, son un 
requisito para entender las decisiones del individuo. Como contestación a los críticos 
del comportamiento, alcanzamos proposiciones que pueden ser contrastadas y hacemos 
varias predicciones.  
Resumiendo, bajo el mismo marco teórico hacemos las contribuciones 
siguientes: (1) Verificamos cómo los incentivos afectan el comportamiento de toma de 
riesgo, proponiendo un modelo donde la referencia desempeña un papel central en la 
relación anterior; (2) Empíricamente contrastamos nuestro modelo de incentivos en 
vista de una muestra mundial representativa de los fondos de acciones; (3) Evaluamos 
qué efecto es más fuerte en un estudio dinámico del comportamiento individual de toma 
de riesgo: house-money o disposition effect, proponiendo un nuevo tratamiento 
experimental; (4) Comparamos los resultados de una encuesta a los experimentales y 
verificamos que no están necesariamente alineados. (5) Generalizamos el 
comportamiento miope de la aversión de la pérdida (myopic loss aversion) con un 
experimento realizado en Brasil y España; (6) Proponemos un modelo teórico de cómo 
los individuos sesgados eligen sus carteras en términos de toma de riesgo; (7) Incluimos 
el error de la estimación en el análisis de la cartera; (8) Evaluamos si los modelos 
teóricos de la selección de carteras deben adaptarse a las características sesgadas de los 
individuos o moderar las características individuales del comportamiento. En este caso 
utilizamos una muestra de varios índices de acciones de diversos países.  
Nuestras proposiciones sugieren que los gerentes en fondos manejados 
pasivamente tiendan a ser recompensados sin el honorario variable y sean adversos al 
riesgo. Por otra parte, en fondos manejados activamente, si los incentivos reducirán o 
aumentarán la toma de riesgo del fondo dependerá de su posibilidad de superar la 
rentabilidad de su cartera de referencia. Si es probable que el fondo supere la cartera de 
referencia, los incentivos (aumentan) reducen el apetito del riesgo del gerente. Además, 
el horizonte evaluativo influencia las preferencias del riesgo del gerente, en el sentido 
que si han obtenido mal (buenos) resultados en un período, ellos tienden para elegir 
inversiones (conservadoras) más arriesgadas en el período siguiente dado el mismo 
horizonte evaluativo. La evidencia empírica presentada en la tesis considerando una 
base representativa de fondos de acciones soporta esas predicciones. Relacionado con el 
house money y disposition effect, empleamos una encuesta y verificamos la existencia 
de house money. Sin embargo, en un experimento demostramos que desaparece el 
efecto house money, y que disposition es el efecto dominante. Nuestros resultados 
también soportan la existencia de la aversión miope de la pérdida a través de países y 
una cierta evidencia del efecto del país. Finalmente, en términos de gerencia de carteras, 
nuestros resultados apoyan el uso de nuestro modelo del comportamiento (BRATE) 
como alternativa para definir la asignación óptima de los activos y postulamos que un 
modelo optimización de cartera se puede adaptar a los sesgos individuales implicados 
por la teoría (prospect theory) sin pérdida de la eficacia.  
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Chapter One 
 
General Introduction 
 
Since the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) two different 
approaches are being used to understand and forecast human behavior in terms of the 
decision making process, applied to economy and other social sciences: the traditional 
rational approach and behavioral theories.  
 The traditional finance paradigm seeks to understand financial markets using 
models in which agents are “rational”. Barberis and Thaler (2003) suggest that 
rationality is a very useful and simple assumption, which means that when agents 
receive new information, they update their beliefs and preferences instantaneously in a 
coherent and normative way such that they are consistent, always choosing alternatives 
which maximize their expected utility. Economists have traditionally used the axioms of 
expected utility and Bayes’ rule to serve both the normative and descriptive purposes.  
The paradigm of individual behavior in traditional finance theory is that of 
expected utility maximization, combined with risk aversion. Ever since it was founded 
by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) the expected utility assumption has been 
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under severe fire as a descriptive1 theory of investor’s behavior. Allais (1953), Ellsberg 
(1961) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) are three prominent examples of this 
critique. Traditional finance has also been empirically rejected in explaining several 
financial phenomena as the growing behavioral finance literature shows. 
 Agency theory has its foundations in traditional economic theory considering 
stable risk preferences. In this perspective the existence of a separation between 
ownership and management in organization creates conflict as some decisions taken by 
the agent may be in his own interest and considered not to be maximizing the 
principal’s welfare, which is called “moral-hazard”, and it is a consequence of the 
information asymmetry between the agent and the principal. An agency relationship has 
arisen between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for the 
other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems. 
Behavioral finance suggests an alternative approach to expected utility and 
agency theory using models in which agents are not fully rational – a theory that is 
consistent with the psychology of the investor. The field has two building blocks: limits 
to arbitrage, which argues that it can be difficult for rational traders to undo the 
dislocations caused by less rational traders; and psychology, which catalogues the kinds 
of deviations from full rationality we might expect to see impacting investors’ beliefs 
and preferences.  
As pointed out by Shefrin (2005), financial economists are in the midst of a 
debate about a paradigm shift, from neoclassical-based paradigm to one that is 
behaviorally based. In the essence of the debate, there is the unsolved problem of how 
individuals make decisions and specifically, how comfortable they are in assuming 
risks. This is the main point we want to address in the present thesis: How and in what 
                                                 
1 Normative theories characterize rational choice, while descriptive theories characterize actual choices. 
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situations individuals are more willing to take risks? We also evaluate the practical 
consequences of a behavioral risk decision in terms of financial efficiency. Our work 
belongs to the field of behavior finance, which has the objective to enhance the 
explanatory power of traditional economic models leading to more realistic 
psychological foundations. 
Behavioral biases can roughly be grouped in two categories: cognitive and 
emotional; though both types yield irrational decisions. Because cognitive biases 
(heuristics like anchoring, availability and representative biases) stem from faulty 
reasoning, better information and advice can often align them with the traditional 
rational theory. Conversely, emotional biases such as regret and loss aversion originate 
from impulsive feelings or intuition, rather than conscious reasoning and are hardly 
possible to be aligned to traditional rationality. Kahneman and Tversky2 (1979) were the 
first to propose the use of behavioral lens to evaluate individuals’ decision-making 
process. Their prospect theory is a psychologically based theory of choice under risk 
and uncertainty. 
In general terms, prospect theory or its latter version cumulative prospect theory3 
posits four novel concepts in the framework of individuals risk preference, which can be 
classified as emotional biases that cannot be eliminated: investors evaluate assets 
according to gains and losses and not according to final wealth (mental accounting), 
individuals are more averse to losses than they are attracted for gains (loss aversion); 
individuals are risk-seeking in the domain of losses and risk averse in the domain of 
                                                 
2 In 2002 their work has been rewarded with the Nobel prize in economics. 
3 CPT (Cumulative Prospect Theory) was proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) as an improvement 
on, and development from, their earlier Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and is a 
combination of Rank Dependent Utility (first proposed by Quiggin, 1982) with reference point to 
differentiate between gains and losses. 
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gains (asymmetric risk preference); individuals evaluate extreme probabilities in a sense 
of overestimating low probabilities and underestimating high probabilities (probability 
weighting function). The theory holds that individuals do not utilise objective 
probabilities in their decisions, but rather transform the objective probabilities using 
non-linear decision weighting function. 
The choice process under prospect theory starts with the editing phase, followed 
by the evaluation of the edited prospects and at the end the alternative with the highest 
value is chosen. During the editing phase agents code outcomes into gains and losses 
and implement mental calculations over the probabilities. In the valuing phase the 
agents attach a subjective value to the lottery and then chose the prospect which 
generates the highest value. 
All previous concepts were already identified in several experiments and we 
consider them stylized facts or invariants of human behavior. Under this perspective, we 
develop a general theoretical framework to infer the risk taking behavior of human 
beings. The main goal of this thesis is to analyze risk taking by individual investors in 
financial markets under a behavioral perspective. We approach this topic through three 
special cases: the role of incentives in risk taking behavior, risk attitudes in a multi 
period analysis; and behavioral risk taking in portfolio choice. The main message we 
want to convey is that we live in a behavioral world and we should study financial 
markets as such. It doesn’t mean that people are completely irrational or that financial 
markets are not efficient. But instead, standard models based on the traditional 
paradigm are not capable to fully describe the human nature in terms of decision-
making. 
Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk 
and incentives, however empirical studies on mutual funds present mixed results. In 
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Chapter 2 we propose a behavioral principal-agent model to the professional manager’s 
context, focusing on the situation of active and passive investment strategy. In this 
general framework we evaluate how incentives affect the manager’s risk taking 
behavior, where the standard moral hazard model is just a special case.  
Our propositions suggest that managers in passive managed funds tend to be 
rewarded without incentive fee and be risk averse. On the other hand, in active managed 
funds, whether incentives will reduce or increase the riskiness of the fund will depend 
on how hard it is to outperform the benchmark. If the fund is (un)likely to outperform 
the benchmark, incentives (increase) reduce the manager’s risk appetite. Furthermore, 
the evaluative horizon influences the trader’s risk preferences, in the sense that if traders 
performed poorly (well) in a period, they tend to choose riskier (conservative) 
investments in the following period given the same evaluative horizon. Empirical 
evidence, based on a comprehensive world sample of mutual funds is also presented in 
this chapter and gives support to the previous propositions. 
Recent literature has advocated that risk-taking behavior is influenced by prior 
monetary gains and losses. On one hand, after perceiving monetary gains, people are 
willing to take more risk. This effect is known as the house-money effect. Another 
stream of the literature, based on prospect theory and loss aversion, suggests that people 
are risk averse/seeking in the gain/loss domain – disposition effect. Also, behavior 
economic research has tended to ignore the role of country differences in financial and 
economic decision-making. 
The objective of Chapter 3 is twofold: first to clarify which effect is dominant in 
a dynamic setting: disposition or house-money; and second to verify the existence of 
myopic loss aversion across countries. We employ a survey approach and find evidence 
of house money effect. However, in an experiment performed in a dynamic financial 
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setting, we show that the house money effect disappears, and that disposition is the 
dominant effect. This finding indicates that care should be taken in generalizing survey 
results. We report supportive results related to existence of myopic loss aversion across 
countries and some evidence of country effect. 
Chapter 4 has two main objectives. The first is to incorporate mental accounting, 
loss aversion, asymmetric risk-taking behavior and probability weighting in a multi-
period portfolio stochastic optimization for individual investors. The previous 
behavioral biases have already been identified in the literature; however their overall 
impact during the process of determining optimal asset allocation in a multi-period 
analysis is still missing. And second, we also take into account the estimation risk in the 
analysis. Considering 26 daily index stock data, from the period from 1995 to 2007, we 
empirically evaluate our model (BRATE – Behavior Resample Adjusted Technique) to 
the traditional Markowitz. Our results support the use of BRATE as an alternative for 
defining optimal asset allocation and posit that a portfolio optimization model may be 
adapted to the individual biases implied by prospect theory without efficiency loss. We 
also explain why investors keep on holding, or even buy, loosing investments. 
 Finally, in Chapter 5 we provide a brief review of the main findings and 
contributions of the thesis and propose several lines for further research. Behavioral 
finance is surely an open avenue and we speculate that future paradigms should be 
centred on this stream of research. 
 Our main conclusion is that absolute evaluations based on final wealth are 
limited and the relativity of risk taking decisions, where the perception of gains and 
losses drives the process, is a requirement to understand individual’s risk decisions. As 
a reply to behavioral critics, we reach propositions that can be falsified and make 
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several predictions. Summing up, under the same theoretical framework we make the 
following contributions: 
- Shed more light on how incentives affect risk taking behavior, proposing a 
model where the reference plays a central role in the previous relationship; 
- Empirically test our incentives model considering a comprehensive world 
sample of equity funds (cross-section data); 
- Evaluate which effect is stronger in multi-period risk taking decisions for 
individual investors: house-money or disposition effect, proposing a novel experimental 
treatment; 
- Compare survey to experimental results finding that they are not necessarily 
aligned. 
- Generalize the myopic loss aversion behavior performing an experiment in 
Brazil and Spain, also verifying some country effect; 
- Propose a theoretical model of how behavioral individuals choose their 
portfolios in terms of risk taking behavior; 
- Include estimation error in the behavioral portfolio analysis; 
- Evaluate whether theoretical models of portfolio choice should adapt or 
moderate the individual behavior characteristics. In this case we used a sample of 
several country equity indices. 
As a last remark, this thesis was elaborated in a way that any of the following 3 
chapters can be read independently. In this sense, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 present complete 
researches that, although sharing the behavioral assumptions explained previously, 
consider different contexts and lead to independent conclusions. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Delegated Portfolio Management and Risk Taking Behavior 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This Chapter deals with a relevant financial phenomenon that occurs in several 
markets. There has been tremendous and persistent growth in the prominence of mutual 
funds and professional investors over the recent years, which is relevant for both 
academics and policy makers (Bank for International Settlements, 2003). Nowadays, 
most real world financial market participants are professional portfolio managers 
(traders), which means that they are not managing their own money, but rather are 
managing money for other people (e.g. pension funds, hedge funds, central banks, 
mutual funds, insurance companies). The value of the assets managed by mutual funds 
rose from $50 billion in 1977 to $4.5 trillion in 1997. Similarly, the assets managed by 
pension plans have grown from around $250 billion in 1977 to 4.2 trillion in 1997 
(Cuoco and Kaniel, 2003). Considering only the United States market during the 
nineties, assets managed by the hedge fund industry experienced exponential growth; 
assets grew from about US$40 billion in the late eighties to over US$650 billion in 
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2003. Assets managed by mutual funds exceed those of hedge funds, as total assets 
managed by mutual funds are in excess of US$6.5 trillion 4(2003). US equity mutual 
funds had total net assets of US$ 4.4 trillion at the end of 2004 (Sensoy, 2006). 
The main reasons for the investor to delegate the right of investing their money 
to traders include: customer service (including record keeping and the ability to move 
money around among funds); low transaction costs; diversification; and professional 
management (traders task). Individual investors expect to receive better results, as they 
are provided a professional investment service. However, an important stylized fact of 
the delegated portfolio management industry is the poor performance of active funds 
compared to passive ones (Stracca, 2005). Fernández et al. (2007a,b) found that just 23 
of 649 Spanish funds outperformed their benchmarks. Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2007) 
found that for active US funds, the ones that charge higher fees often obtained lower 
performance. Thus, active management appears to subtract, rather than add value5. A 
way to justify the previous empirical evidence is to assume that the delegated portfolio 
management context generates an agency feature that has relevant negative 
consequences. As investors usually lack specialized knowledge (information 
asymmetry), they may evaluate the trader just based on his performance, generating 
early liquidation of the trader’s strategy, and can lead to mispricing. This is called the 
“separation of capital and brains” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Also, Rabin and 
Vayanos (2007), show that investors move assets too often in and out mutual funds, and 
exaggerate the value of financial information and expertise. 
                                                 
4 Data provided by HedgeCo.net 
5 Fernandez et al. (2007) show that during the last 10 years (1997-2006), the average return of mutual 
funds in Spain (2.7%) was smaller than average inflation (2.9%). 
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Despite relevant research on incentives produced in both scientific areas, 
management and economics, the search for integrative models has been neglected. In 
general, management papers usually provide good intuition and interpretation but lack a 
more precise methodology and often reach ambiguous results. On the other hand, 
economic papers are usually tied to classical rationality assumptions and just capture 
one side of an issue. Moreover, standard models of moral hazard predict a negative 
relationship between risk and incentives, but empirical work has not confirmed this 
prediction (Araújo, Moreira and Tsuchida, 2004).   
Building on agency and prospect theory, Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) 
first proposed a behavioral agency model (BAM) of executive risk taking suggesting 
that the executive risk propensity varies across and within different forms of 
monitoring, and that agents may exhibit risk seeking as well as risk averse behaviors. 
However, this study considered only a single period model applied to the case of 
company CEOs. 
In this Chapter, considering BAM to the professional portfolio manager’s 
context, and using the theory of contracts and behavior-inspired utility functions, we 
propose an integrative model that aims to explain the risk taking behavior of the traders 
with respect to active or passive investment strategies. Our focus is on relative risk 
taking measured against a certain benchmark. We argue that BAM can better explain 
the situation of professional portfolio managers, elucidating the way incentives in active 
or passive investment strategies affect the attitudes of traders towards risk6. Our 
                                                 
6 A portfolio manager decides the scale of the response to an information signal (he also decides the 
required effort) and so influences both the level of the risk and the portfolio returns. As pointed out in 
Stracca (2005), in a standard agency problem, the agent controls either the return or the variance, but not 
both. The previous specific characteristic offers its own challenges as the fact that the agent controls the 
effort and can influence risk makes it more difficult for the principal to write optimal contracts.  
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propositions suggest that managers in passively managed funds tend to be rewarded 
without an incentive fee and are risk averse. On the other hand, in actively managed 
funds, whether incentives reduce or increase the riskiness of the fund will depend on 
how hard is to outperform the benchmark. If the fund is likely to outperform the 
benchmark, incentives reduce the manager’s risk appetite, while the opposite is true if 
the fund is unlikely to outperform the benchmark. Furthermore, the evaluative horizon 
influences the trader’s risk preferences, in the sense that if traders performed poorly in a 
period, they tend to choose riskier investments in the following period given the same 
evaluative horizon. Conversely, if traders performed well in a given time period, they 
tend to choose more conservative investments following that period.  We test our 
propositions in a world sample of equity mutual funds, finding supportive results. 
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, we first 
offer a brief literature review. Section 3 describes the professional portfolio manager’s 
context and formally presents the model, positing the propositions. Section 4 provides 
some empirical evidence supporting the model and Section 5 concludes with a summary 
of the main findings. 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
 
The traditional finance paradigm seeks to understand financial markets using 
models in which agents are “rational”. Barberis and Thaler (2003) suggest that 
rationality is a very useful and simple assumption.  This means that when agents receive 
new information, they instantaneously update their beliefs and preferences in a coherent 
and normative way such that they are consistent, always choosing alternatives which 
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maximize their expected utility. Unfortunately, this approach has been empirically 
challenged in explaining several financial phenomena, as demonstrated in the growing 
behavioral finance literature7. The increase in price of a stock which has been included 
in an Index (Harris and Gurel, 1986) and the case of the twin shares which were priced 
differently (Barberis and Thaler, 2003) are examples of the empirical market anomalies 
found in the literature.  
Agency theory has its foundations in traditional economics assuming the 
previous “rationality” paradigm. The perspective of a separation between ownership and 
management creates conflict as some decisions taken by the agent may be in his own 
interest and may not maximize the principal’s welfare (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
This is known as “moral-hazard”, and it is a consequence of the information asymmetry 
between the agent and the principal. We say that an agency relationship has arisen 
between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for the other, 
designated as the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  
Related to the main assumptions, agency theory considers that humans are 
rationally bound, self-interested and prone to opportunism. It explores the consequences 
of power delegation and the costs involved in this context characterized by an agent 
which has much more information than the principal about the firm (information 
asymmetry). The delegation of decision-making power from the principal to the agent is 
problematic in that: (i) the interests of the principal and agent will typically diverge; (ii) 
the principal cannot perfectly monitor the actions of the agent without incurring any 
costs; and (iii) the principal cannot perfectly monitor and acquire information available 
to or possessed by the agent without incurring any costs. If agents could be induced to 
                                                 
7 Allias paradox and Ellsberg paradox. 
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internalize the principal’s objectives with no associated costs, there would be no place 
for agency models (Hart and Homstrom, 1987).  
Moreover, while focusing on divergent objectives that principals and agents may 
present, agency theory considers principals as risk neutrals in the individual actions of 
their firms, because they can diversify their shareholding across different companies. 
Formally, principals are assumed to be able to diversify the idiosyncratic risk but they 
still bear market risk. On the other hand, since agent employment and income are tied to 
one firm, they are considered risk averse in order to diminish the risk they face to their 
individual wealth. (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997).  
Hence, current agency literature considers that principals and agents have 
predefined and stable risk preferences and that risk seeking attitudes are irrational. 
Highlighting this fact, Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia (2002) posit that agency 
theorists give little consideration to the processes in which individual agents obtain their 
preferences and make strategic decisions for their firms. Some empirical studies have 
shown that people systematically violate previous risk assumptions when choosing risky 
investments, and depending on the situation, risk seeking attitudes may be present. This 
occurrence of risk seeking behavior was already identified by several studies related to 
choices between negative prospects, and the most prominent of these studies is that of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) which proposes the prospect theory. 
In general, prospect theory8 posits four novel concepts in the framework of 
individuals risk preferences: investors evaluate financial alternatives according to gains 
and losses and not according to final wealth (mental accounting); individuals are more 
averse to losses than they are attracted to gains (loss aversion); individuals are risk 
seeking in the domain of losses, and risk averse in the gains domain (asymmetric risk 
                                                 
8 And in its latter version (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992) known as cumulative prospect theory. 
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preference); and individuals evaluate extreme events in a sense of overestimating low 
probabilities and underestimating high probabilities (probability weighting function). In 
this Chapter, we consider a behavior inspired utility function, in the framework of 
delegated portfolio managers, which takes into account the first three stated concepts.  
Coval and Shumway (2005) found strong evidence that CBOT traders were 
highly loss-averse, assuming high afternoon risk to recover from morning losses. In an 
interesting experiment, Haigh and List (2005) used traders recruited from the CBOT 
and found evidence of myopic loss aversion, supporting behavioral concepts. They 
conclude that expected utility theory may not model professional trader behavior well, 
and this finding lends credence to behavioral economics and finance models as they 
relax inherent assumptions used in standard financial economics. Aveni (1989) in a 
study about organizational bankruptcy posit that creditors wish to avoid recognizing 
losses and thus tend to assume more risk then they would otherwise take.  
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) argue that prospect and agency theories can 
be understood as complementing each other for reaching better predictions of risk 
taking by managers. Fernandes et al. (2007), in an analysis of risk factors in forty-one 
international stock markets, show that tail risk is a relevant risk factor. We argue that 
tail risk can be associated with loss aversion and therefore the BAM offers more fruitful 
results in the professional managers’ context.  
Now, we will comment on the main criticism received by this approach. 
Traditional rational theorists believe that: (i) people, through repetition, will learn their 
way out of biases; (ii) experts in a field, such as traders in an investment institution, will 
make fewer errors; and (iii) with more powerful incentives, the effects will disappear. 
While all these factors can attenuate biases to some extent, there is little evidence that 
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they can be completely eliminated9. Thaler (2000) suggests that “homo economicus” 
will become a slower learner. In this Chapter, we address the argument of incentives 
(iii), showing that in some cases, compensation contracts may even induce risk seeking 
attitudes. 
 As noted by Hart and Holmstrom (1987), underlying each agent model is an 
incentive problem caused by some form of asymmetric information. The literature on 
incentives and compensation contracts is very extensive, both on theoretical and 
empirical studies. Among them there is a consensus about the usefulness of piece-rate 
contracts in order to increase productivity10. In our study, we approach the professional 
portfolio manager's setting considering a widely used piece-rate contract. 
 Baker (2000) concludes that most real-world incentive contracts pay people on 
the basis of risky and distorted performance measures. This is powerful evidence that 
developing riskless and undistorted performance measures is a costly activity. We 
extend the previous argument showing that the use of risky performance measures 
might be in the interest of companies to induce risk seeking behavior of the agent.  
Araujo, Moreira and Tsuchida (2004) discuss the negative relationship between 
risk and incentives, predicted by conventional theory but not verified by empirical 
                                                 
9 Behavioral literature suggests two types of biases: cognitive and emotional. Cognitive biases 
(representativeness, anchorism, etc) are related to misunderstanding and lack of information about the 
prospect, and can be mitigated through learning. On the other hand, emotional biases (loss aversion, 
asymmetric risk taking behavior, etc) are human intrinsic reactions and may not be moderated. 
10  Lazear (2000a), analyzing a data set for the Safelite Glass Corporation found that productivity 
increased  by 44% as the company adopted a piece-rate compensation scheme. Bandiera, Barankay and 
Ransul (2004) found that productivity is at least 50% higher under piece rates, considering the personnel 
data from a UK soft fruit farm for the 2002 season. Lazear (2000b) stresses that the main reason to use 
piece-rate contracts is to provide better incentives when the workforce is heterogeneous. 
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studies. They propose a model with adverse selection followed by a moral hazard, 
where the effort and degree of risk aversion is the private information of an agent who 
can control the mean and the variance of profits, and conclude that more risk adverse 
agents provide more effort in risk reduction.  
Palomino and Prat (2002) develop a general model of delegated portfolio 
management, where the risk neutral agent can control the riskiness of the portfolio.  
They show that the optimal contract is simply a bonus contract. In an empirical study, 
Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2004) evaluate incentives and risk taking in hedge funds, 
finding that returns of hedge funds with incentive fees are not significantly more risky 
than the returns of funds without such a compensation contract.  
 Our approach is distinguished from the previous approaches as we consider 
changes in risk preference of the agents depending on how they frame their optimization 
problem rather than assuming risk aversion or risk neutrality from the beginning. 
Agents are still considered to be value maximizers, but we are using behavior-inspired 
utility functions, based on prospect theory. We also focus on relative risk measured 
against a certain benchmark (tracking error), instead of total risk, as this is the relevant 
variable of interest for individual investors to decide whether to put their money in 
passive or active funds. 
The key element to apply prospect theory to our context is to identify what the 
trader perceives as a loss or a gain, in other words, to determine what their reference 
point should be. In the mutual funds industry, benchmarks are widely used and are 
published in their prospects. It is safe to assume the return of the benchmark as the 
trader’s reference point. If he can anticipate a negative frame problem, his loss aversion 
behavior will lead him to go on riskier actions in order to avoid his losses even if there 
are other less risky alternatives which could minimize the loss. This is based on a 
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behavioral effect called "escalation of commitment". The intuition is that, due to the 
convex shape of the value function in the range of losses, risk seeking behavior will 
prevail in the case of prior losses.  
Daido and Itoh (2005) propose an agency model with reference-dependent 
preferences to explain the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will 
succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he 
will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). They show that the agent with high 
expectations about his performance can be induced to choose a high effort with low-
powered incentives. Empirical evidence of the escalation situation can be found in 
Odean (1998) and Weber and Camerer (1998). They found that investors sell stocks that 
trade above the purchase price (winners) relatively more often than stocks that trade 
below the purchase price (losers). Both papers interpreted this behavior as evidence of 
decreased risk aversion after a loss and increased risk aversion after a gain.  
 
2.3. The Decision Making Model 
 
We consider professional portfolio managers to be traders who are responsible 
for managing the financial resources of others who work for financial institutions such 
as: pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, banks, and central banks.  Their 
jobs consist of investing financial resources, selecting assets (e.g. stocks, bonds), and 
often using an index as a reference. Despite high competition in financial markets, we 
argue that traders, as any human beings, are continuously dealing with their own 
emotional biases which make their attitudes toward risk different depending on how 
they frame the situation they face. 
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A characteristic that can affect trader behavior is if the funds they manage have a 
passive or active investment strategy. Under active management, securities in the 
portfolio and other potential securities are regularly evaluated in order to find specific 
investment opportunities.  Managers make buy/sell decisions based on current and 
projected future performance. This strategy, while tending toward more volatile 
earnings and transaction costs, may provide above-average returns. In this case, traders 
must be much more specialized because results are directly related to how they choose 
among different assets and allocate the resources of the fund in order to obtain better 
profits.  
On the other hand, in the passive strategy, part or the entire portfolio is settled to 
follow a predetermined index, such as the S&P500 or the FTSE100, with the idea of 
mimicking market performance (tracking the index). Traders are much more worried 
about constructing a portfolio similar to the index than in trying to find investment 
opportunities. In this situation, a trader’s activity can be specified in advance as it 
consists of allocating the resources closely to a predetermined public index, and then it 
is much more programmable and predictable, which raises the possibility for better 
control. This strategy requires less administrative costs, tends to avoid under-market 
returns and lessens transaction costs. However, because of their commitment to 
maintaining an exogenously determined portfolio, managers of these funds generally 
retain stocks, regardless of their individual performance.  
The approach suggested by Eisenhardt (1985) yields task programmability, 
information systems, and uncertainty as determinants of control strategy (outcome or 
behavior based). Outcome-based contracts transfer risk from the principal to the agent 
and it is viewed as a way of mitigating the agency costs involved. But this rewarding 
package has a side effect, as appropriate behaviors can lead to good or bad outcomes. It 
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is a very complex problem to isolate the effect of the specific agent’s behavior on the 
outcome, especially in businesses with high risk. Contingent pay will be more effective 
in motivating agents when outcomes can be controlled or influenced by them. Bloom 
and Milkovich (1998) posit that higher levels of business risk not only make it more 
difficult for principals to determine what actions agents take, but also make it more 
difficult for principals to determine what actions agents should take. 
In line with the agency literature (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; 1991), we 
model the interaction between a risk neutral, profit maximizer principal and a value-
maximizing agent in a competitive market. The principal delegates the management of 
his funds to the agent, whose efforts can affect the probability distribution of the 
portfolio excess return - differential return for a given portfolio, relative to a certain 
benchmark11, ( ))(),( 2 ttNxxx bp σμ→−= . The agent's task is related to obtaining 
information about expected returns and defining portfolio strategies. The agent chooses 
an effort level “t” incurring in a personal cost C(t). We consider the general differential 
assumptions for C(t): C’(t) > 0 and C’’(t) > 0. Also, let’s call 0C  the agent’s minimum 
cost of effort required to follow a passive strategy and just replicate the benchmark12. 
Consider: 
2
)(
2
0
tCtC +=           (Eq. 01) 
And, the portfolio excess return is given by: 
)()( ttx εμ +=           (Eq. 02) 
                                                 
11 xp is the portfolio return and xb is the return of the benchmark. 
12 This cost is related to the index tracking activity and can be estimated considering the ETF’s (Exchange 
Traded Funds) total management fee. 
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where )(tμ  is concave and increasing, referring to the part of the return due to his level 
effort (t). Also take ε(t) ~ N(0, σ2(t)). In order to simplify, we assume that the 
performance of the trader has a linear relationship with his efforts plus a random 
variable, so that: tt μμ =)( , and then: 
)(      ttx εμ +=           (Eq. 03) 
 Moreover, the timing of the proposed principal-agent game is: (i) the principal 
proposes a contract to the agent; (ii) the agent may or may not accept the contract, and if 
he accepts, he receives an amount of funds to invest; (iii) the reference point of the 
agent is defined; (iv) the agent chooses the level of effort (related to his personal 
investment strategy) to spend; (v) the outcome of the investment is realized and the 
principal pays the agent using part of the benefits generated by the chosen strategy and 
keeps the remaining return. 
In this case the certainty equivalent of the agent’s utility, as proposed in 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), can be given by: 
[ ]
)('
)(''
2
1)()( 22
xv
xvtCxwECEa ασ+−=           (Eq. 04) 
where E[w(x)] is the expected wage of the trader, considered as a function of the 
information signal (excess return), α  is the performance pay factor, and )(xv is the 
trader’s value function, which depends on x , the agent’s perceived gain or loss related 
to his reference point (benchmark). In the previous model, 
βαεαμβα ++=+= )()( ttxxw , and so [ ] .)()( 22 txwVar σα=  
The value function was proposed in the prospect theory of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) and is an adaptation of the standard utility function in the case of the 
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behavior approach. The ratio 
)('
)(''
μ
μ
v
v  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. For a 
risk averse agent, this ratio is negative and the certainty equivalent is less than the 
expected value of the gamble as he prefers to reduce uncertainty. This is the origin of 
the negative relationship between risk and incentives in moral hazard models. 
Let t* denote the agent’s optimal choice of effort, given α. Note that t* is 
independent of β. The resulting indirect utility is given by: )(),( αββα vV += , where 
*)(
)('
)(''
2
1*)(*)()( 22 t
xv
xvtCtv σααμα +−=  is the non-linear term. The marginal utility of 
incentives can then be derived: 
*)(
)('
)(''*)( 2 t
xv
xvtvv σαμα α +==∂
∂           (Eq. 05) 
and if we were considering risk averse agents, it would represent the mean of the excess 
profits minus the marginal risk premium.  
The effort of the agent leads to an expected benefits function B(t) which accrues 
directly to the principal. Let’s consider B(t) = xb + x. The principal’s expected profit 
(which equals certainty equivalent as he is risk neutral) is given by: 
[ ])()( xwEtBCE p −=           (Eq. 06) 
Hence the total certainty equivalent (our measure of total surplus) is: 
)(
)('
)(''
2
1
2
22
2
0 txv
xvtCxxCECETCE bpa σα+−−+=+=           (Eq. 07) 
The optimal contract is the one that maximizes this total surplus subject to the 
agent’s participation constraint (CEa≥0). Adapting the previous model to the 
professional manager’s case and considering mental accounting, loss aversion and 
asymmetric risk taking behavior, we assume the value function as follows: 
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where r is the coefficient of absolute risk preference, λ  is the loss aversion factor which 
makes the value function steeper in the negative side; and x is the perceived gain or loss, 
rather than final states of welfare, as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). It is 
useful to consider the previous form for the value function because of the existence of a 
CAPM equilibrium (Giorgi et al., 2004) and because we reach constant coefficients of 
risk preference. The following graph indicates )(xv when α  = 0.88, −λ = 2.25 and +λ = 1 
(using values suggested by Kahneman and Tversky).  
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Figure 1 – Prospect theory value function for  α  = 0.88, −λ = 2.25 and +λ = 1 
We assume a general symmetric compensation contract applied to the situation 
presented in this paper. Starks (1987) shows that the “symmetric” contract, while it does 
not necessarily eliminate agency costs, dominates the convex (bonus) contract in 
aligning the manager’s interests with those of the investor. Also, Grinblatt and Titman 
(1989) posit that penalties for poor performance should be at least as severe as the 
rewards for good performance. 
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βα += xxw )(           (Eq. 09) 
This indicates that the agent is paid a base salary β plus an incentive fee 
calculated as a proportion α of the total return of the fund (the performance indicator). 
The previous contract arrangement follows the optimal compensation scheme defined in 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), and was also used in Carpenter (2000). Lazear 
(2000b) argues that continuous and variable pay is appropriate in case of worker 
heterogeneity as in the case of professional portfolio managers. Finally, let’s call ψ the 
probability that the fund outperforms the benchmark and (1 – ψ) the likelihood that it 
performs poorly. So, we can re-write the TCE, CEa and CEp as follows: 
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(Eq. 10) 
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(Eq. 11) 
βα −−+= xxCE bp )1(           (Eq. 12) 
2.3.1. The Case of Passive Funds 
Investors in passive funds have expectations of receiving average market returns 
(E(xp) = E(xb) and E(x) = 0), and trader actions are limited and tied in relation to the 
process of buying and selling assets to adjust stock weights in the portfolio in order to 
follow the benchmark. The agent’s task is more programmable and his behavior is easy 
to monitor (“t” is observable by the principal). As the principal has no interest that the 
agent goes on riskier strategies than that of the benchmark, he should set α = 0. Thus, 
the certainty equivalent of the agent would be given by:  
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which implies that t* = 0. Optimally, the agent will make no effort to beat the 
benchmark. An important aspect considered in this paper is the competitive situation in 
the market of professional portfolio managers, which is of crucial importance in 
determining who extracts the surplus from the agency contract. We considered, as it is 
usual in the delegated portfolio managers' literature, a perfect competition among agents  
with the entire surplus accrued to the principal. This situation implies that: CEa = 0 and 
0C=β . The certainty equivalent of the principal would be given by: CEp = xb – C0. 
The principal pays the agent a base salary which is equal to the agent’s cost of 
effort to ensure the investor receives the return of the benchmark (say the agent's choice 
of effort represents the minimum level needed to replicate the benchmark portfolio). 
Moreover, if the agent chooses a level of effort different from C0, the performance of 
the fund will not be tied to the performance of the benchmark and so σ2(x) > 0 
(increased the risk). If the agent just receives the base salary alone, he doesn’t have any 
incentive to choose a level of effort different from 0 and so performs in a risk averse 
way. Also, because of employment risk, managers tend to decrease risk in order to 
prevent potential job loss (Kempf et al, 2007). 
In this incentive scheme, there’s no risk premium associated with the agent’s 
decisions. Recall that in this case t is observable, and then if the trader chooses t ≠ 0, the 
investor will notice and just fire him. Finally, in this case, there is no reason for using 
incentive fees, as the trader is not responsible for the earnings of the fund, which should 
be equal to the performance of the benchmark. Observe that the previous result is robust 
for different levels of risk preference as it is independent of the value function of the 
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agent, regardless of whether he is risk averse or risk seeking. Summing up, we can 
construct the following table: 
Table 1 - Agent’s Choice of Effort in a Passive Fund 
Agent’s choice of t Compensation Performance Risk Result
t = 0 w = β x = xb σ2= 0 optimum
t ≠ 0 w = β x ≠ xb σ2> 0 agent is fired
 
Proposition One: Traders in passively managed funds tend to be rewarded with a base 
salary (α = 0). 
Proposition Two: Traders in passively managed funds are more likely to perform as 
risk adverse agents (t = tp*). 
 
2.3.2.  The Case of Active Funds 
In the case of an active fund, investors are usually expecting to receive above-
average risk adjusted returns as they consider it linked to the expertise of the traders. 
The trader has to make investment decisions, and a great number of these decisions are 
based on his own point of view of the market, raising a relevant problem of information 
asymmetry (moral hazard). In this case, the first best results are no longer feasible and 
outcome-based rewards are often used as part of their contracts and the agent is 
stimulated to go on risky alternatives in order to reach above-average returns. Hence, 
the idea of the contract is to reduce objective incongruence between the principal 
(investor) and agent (trader), and to transfer risk to the agent. 
 We now examine two cases. In the single task case, the agent’s effort affects 
only the mean of the excess return. In the multitask case, the agent’s effort influences 
both the expected return and the risk of the portfolio. 
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a)  Single Task 
 We first analyze the case in which the agent’s effort controls only the mean of 
the excess profits and so the risk is exogenous: 22 )( σσ =x . Consider a loss averse 
agent with a value function given by (Eq. 08). The main point in applying prospect 
utility is to define the reference point by which the manager measures his gains and 
losses. It seems reasonable in the funds industry to assume the returns of the public 
benchmark published by the fund as a reference point, since it is the one used by 
individual investors when deciding which fund to invest in. Thus, the total certainty 
equivalent would be given by: 
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Taking into account the agent’s maximization problem, we reach the following 
results: 
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(Eq. 15) 
so, αμ=*t  and 
2
**)( 0
tCtC += . As expected, efforts in outperforming the benchmark 
increases with incentives. The agent’s marginal utility of incentives is given by: 
))1((22 λψψσααμα −−−= rv           (Eq. 16) 
So the effect of incentives on the agent’s utility will depend on whether the 
benchmark is likely to be outperformed. Suppose that the fund can easily outperform 
the benchmark. In this case, the probability that the return of the fund is greater than the 
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benchmark, ψ, is close to one and 0>μ . Then, 22 σααμα rv −= , which is the usual 
solution found by moral hazard models. This implies that an increase in incentives has 
both positive and negative effects on the utility of the agent. The positive effect results 
from the share of the positive excess return, and the negative effect comes from the 
increased risk of the wage. Finally, when we maximize the total surplus:  
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 So the relationship between risk and return is ambiguous, depending on how 
likely it is to outperform the benchmark. As previous experiments have shown that the 
value for λ is around 2 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) if ψ is higher than 67%, then a 
negative relationship between risk and incentives is predicted by the model. However, 
as we decrease ψ, a positive relation between risk and return appears.  
If we consider a benchmark that is easy to be outperformed, then ψ approaches 1 
and so 
r22
2
σμ
μα +=           (Eq. 18) 
and therefore, increases in 2σ  and r  imply decreases in α . The previous negative 
relationship between risk (σ2) and incentives (α) is the usual standard result obtained by 
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moral hazard models. However our model generalizes this, and the previous result is 
simply a special case. If we consider a benchmark that is difficult to outperform, then ψ 
approaches 0 and so 
λσμ
μα
r22
2
−=           (Eq. 19) 
and, therefore, increases in 2σ  and r  imply increases in α . Some empirical papers 
have found previous positive relationships between risk and return. 
Recall that 2σ  in our model represents a variance in the differential portfolio 
which uses the benchmark as its reference (tracking error).  The performance of the 
benchmark XB and the performance of the chosen portfolio XP are respectively given by: 
BBB XEX ε+= )(  ,   with ),0(~ 2BB N σε  
,)( PPP XEX ε+=    with ),0(~  2PP N σε  
Also we consider that the expected return of the benchmark is normalized to 
zero {E(XB) = 0} and the expected return of the portfolio equals the agent’s choice of 
effort {E(XP) = μt}. Therefore, the return of the differential portfolio is given by: 
      ) -( BPBP tXX εεμ +=⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −  
then 
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Finally, consider the simplified assumption that 2P2B σσ =  (i.e. the total risk of the 
portfolio selected by the manager is the same as the total risk of the benchmark 
portfolio, so based on portfolio theory, both portfolios should be equivalent in terms of 
risk/return trade-off), where ρ is the correlation coefficient between the chosen portfolio 
and the benchmark. Therefore, α can be rewritten as: 
[ ]λψψρσμ
μα
)1()1(2 2P
2
2
−−−+= r           (Eq. 21) 
which suggests that increases in α  imply increases in )1( 22P ρσ − , and also implies a 
decreasing correlation (ρ), for low values of ψ. Thus, using the benchmark as a filter 
reduces uncontrollable risk by (1 – ρ). If the agent just reproduces the benchmark 
(passive strategy), the correlation is equal to 1 (perfect correlation), all risk can be 
filtered out, and the first best can be achieved. Because of the agency problem, we see 
that the agent’s choice will depend on the degree of idiosyncratic risk associated with 
his contract, as measured by )1(2P ρσ − . Unlike standard portfolio theory (Markowitz, 
1952), idiosyncratic risk will play a role in incentive schemes. 
Proposition Three: Traders in actively managed funds tend to be rewarded in 
incentive-base pay (α > 0). 
Proposition Four: The relationship between incentives and risk can either be positive 
or negative depending on the likelihood ψ of outperforming the benchmark. High (low) 
values of ψ imply a negative (positive) relationship.  
Table 2 - Agent’s Choice of Effort in an Active Fund 
Agent’s choice of t Compensation Performance Risk Result
t = 0 w = β x = 0 σ2= 0 agent is fired
t = t* w = αx + β x > 0 σ2> 0 optimum
t = t* w = αx + β x < 0 σ2> 0 agent is fired
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b)  Multi Task 
We now introduce the possibility that the agent can also influence the risk of the 
portfolio’s excess return. Let tμ and tσ be the effort in mean increase and in variance 
reduction. We assume the cost is quadratic and separable: 
22
)(
22
0
σμ ttCtC ++= . Also, 
let μμμ tt =)(  and ( )202 )( σσσ tt −= , where the exogenous variance 20σ  is the 
variance of the excess return when no effort is provided to change it. Taking into 
account the agent’s maximization problem, we reach the following results: 
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rt . As expected, efforts to outperform the 
benchmark increase with incentives. The endogenous variance is then given by: 
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which implies that endogenous risk can be lower or greater than exogenous risk 
depending on whether the agent is framing a gain or loss situation. If the benchmark is 
easily outperformed, ψ approaches 1 and 20
2
2
2
1
1)( σασ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+= rt , and so endogenous risk 
and incentives are negatively related. On the other hand, if the agent is framing a loss 
situation, the endogenous risk would be given by 20
2
2
2
1
1)( σλασ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−= rt , and a positive 
relationship between risk and incentives is predicted.  
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 Summing up, our model predicts that when the fund manager is facing a 
situation of high likelihood to outperform the benchmark, he will frame the portfolio 
construction problem in the gain domain, and will act in a risk averse way, and 
incentives will stimulate him to exert efforts to reduce risk and improve the expected 
excess return. Incentives are lower in riskier portfolios. On the other hand, when he is 
facing a situation of low likelihood to outperform the benchmark, the agent is likely to 
frame the investment problem in the loss domain, and incentives will make him look for 
riskier alternatives. Incentives are higher in riskier portfolios. 
c)  Multi-Period Analysis 
In this section, we discuss the effect of previous outcomes in the future risk 
appetite of the agent. Wright, Kroll and Elenkov (2002) posit that institutional owners 
exerted a significant positive influence on risk taking in the presence of growth 
opportunities. Gruber (1996) showed that in the American economy, actively managed 
funds assumed greater risk, but reached lower average returns compared to passively 
managed funds.  
Hence, in some sense, we have the investment strategy and the contract 
arrangements disciplining the risk taking behavior of the agent.  However we are aware 
that the trader’s cognitive biases moderate this relationship. In this study, we do not deal 
with the way these biases moderate the relationship as a deeper psychological analysis 
of the trader in his context is required, and we also assume that cognitive biases can be 
moderated. 
Going further in the analysis of the relationship with risk-return, we can apply 
Miller and Bromiley´s (1990) multiperiod approach to the professional investor 
environment, taking into account the evaluative period. We assume that a company has 
a target performance level which for instance corresponds to the performance of a 
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chosen index and the firm provides a report annually to the investors. Investors and 
traders are likely to consider this target as the reference point for gain/loss analysis.  
Supposing that in the first semester, this company performed poorly and so the 
likelihood of outperforming the benchmark is lower, the loss aversion of the agent will 
make him choose risky projects in the second semester hoping to convert losses into 
gains until the end of the year. On the other hand if the company performed well in the 
first period, the agent will only accept an increase in risk if the investment opportunity 
offers high expected returns. In this case, the trader tends to reduce his relative risk 
exposure and follow the index in the second semester in order to guarantee the return 
obtained in the previous period. This is based on a behavioral effect called "escalation 
of commitment". In other words, if the fund performed well in the first period, the 
likelihood of outperforming the benchmark is higher (greater ψ) and the trader is more 
likely to perform in a risk averse way (gain domain). Weber and Zuchel (2003) found 
that subjects in the "portfolio treatment" take significantly greater risks following a loss 
than a gain.  
Deephouse and Wiseman (2000) found supportive evidence to these risk-return 
relationships in a large sample of US manufacturing firms. Odean (1998) and Weber 
and Camerer (1998) provide empirical evidence of the escalation situation; these studies 
found that investors sell stocks that trade above the purchase price (winners) relatively 
more often than stocks that trade below purchase price (losers). Both works interpreted 
this behavior as evidence of decreased risk aversion after a loss and increased risk 
aversion after a gain. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) also found supportive empirical 
evidence that an agent with a low interim result is tempted to look for high-risk 
investments. 
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Proposition Five: If traders performed (well) poorly in a period, they tend to choose 
(less risky) riskier investments in the following period, considering both in the same 
evaluative horizon. 
 Basak et al. (2003) state that as the year-end approaches, when the fund's year-
to-date return is sufficiently high, fund managers set strategies to closely mimic the 
benchmark; however they argue that this is because of the convexities in the manager's 
objectives. We extend this approach, stating that the previous proposition is a direct 
consequence of the individual behavior inspired utility function. 
 
d)  Asymmetric Contract 
 Despite the fact that most mutual funds adopt a symmetric compensation 
contract, there are a few which use asymmetric option-based contract as follows: 
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          (Eq. 23) 
where γ is usually called the performance fee. If we considered an incentive scheme, as 
defined in Eq. 23, the main conclusions of our model would remain with the expression 
(21) now given by: 
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 As can be seen, the only effect of γ would be to increase the negative relation 
between incentives and risk, in the case of an easy to be outperformed benchmark. If the 
benchmark is difficult to outperform, the performance fee has no effect. Probably due to 
its diminished effect on risk, the performance fee is not common. Empirical papers 
(Kouwenberg and Ziemba, 2004; Golec and Starks, 2002) found mixed results related to 
the impact of performance fees on risk taking behavior. 
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 Table 3 provides a summary of the main formulas for α in all the cases 
considered. From the model, we can state the following predictions to be tested in the 
empirical section of this chapter: 
1. Passive funds have lower management fees than active funds13; 
2. Asymmetric contracts are less common than symmetric contracts; 
3. Active funds which are likely to outperform the benchmark show a negative 
relationship between relative risk (tracking error) and incentives. 
4. Active funds which are likely to under perform the benchmark will show a 
positive relationship between relative risk (tracking error) and incentives; 
5. Active funds under performing the benchmark in one given period tend to 
increase their relative risk (tracking error) in the subsequent period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 We can consider the management fee of a passive fund as a proxy for the β in our compensation 
scheme, and in this case, as predicted by the model, the management fee for passive funds should be 
lower than for active funds. 
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Table 3 - Summary of the Equations 
Passive Funds α = 0 
 
 
 
 
Active Funds 
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2.4.  Empirical Analysis 
 
2.4.1.  Data 
 For our empirical investigation, we used the Bloomberg cross-sectional equity 
mutual funds database for February 2007. There are 4584 funds using 26 different 
equity benchmarks (stock indices) from 15 countries14. The database includes emerging 
markets (Brazil, Mexico) as well as developed countries (United States, United 
Kingdom, Germany)15. As the theoretical model proposed in this paper is always 
                                                 
14 All funds in the database are alive as of January, 2007. Unfortunately data on the dead funds for the 
sample used was not available. 
15 We also used daily data from January 2002 to February 2007 for 739 funds from France, United States, 
Brazil and Japan in a total of 787.216 day-fund-return data from the Bloomberg time series database in 
order to validate the results based on the cross-sectional Bloomberg data. 
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dependent on the reference considered, all the analysis is performed separately for each 
benchmark. As in the funds market, the use of a public benchmark is widespread (Elton 
et al., 2003), we assume that fund managers tend to be evaluated and compensated using 
the benchmark as the reference point, to which gains and losses are defined. 
 Table 4 provides some descriptive statistics of the funds in the database. The 
funds were grouped by the benchmark they use to evaluate their performance, and so we 
can consider that they compete for the same class of investors. The number of funds for 
each benchmark varies from 32 (Austrian Stock Exchange) to 1332 (S&P500). From the 
list of funds, just 261 (5.67%) use performance fees indicating that this sort of 
asymmetric compensation contract is not common, except for Brazil (IBOVESPA), 
where 18.10% of the funds charge performance fees.  
The mean management fee among the entire sample is 1.36% (median 1.25%). 
Mexican funds charge the highest management fees (mean 4.84%) and U.S. funds, 
which use the Russell 3000 index benchmark, have the lowest management fee (mean 
0.68%). The average volatility of management fees is 0.97, highest in Brazil (1.77) and 
lowest in Taiwan (0.25). In terms of net asset value (given in the country’s currency), 
the mean is usually much higher than the median indicating the concentration of the 
market, with few large funds and many small ones. In terms of fund age, we have a 
sample of established funds with an average age of 10.55 years and a median ranging 
from 5.99 (IBOVESPA) to 16.79 (Germany REX Total Index). 
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of the Funds’ Data 
Descriptive statistics of the funds in the database are displayed. The cross-sectional mean, median and 
standard deviation of the management fee (values in %), the net asset value (millions unit in the country’s 
currency), and the age (in years) are listed, respectively, for each country. The number of funds for each 
country, and those using a performance fee are also displayed.  
 
 We have a representative cross country sample of established mutual funds, 
diversified in terms of size. The global nature of the data can surely provide good 
insight for testing the theoretical model proposed in Section 3 of this chapter. 
2.4.2.  Empirical Results 
 In order to test our propositions, we will first distinguish between active and 
passive funds. From our predictions, passive funds should have a very small variable 
pay factor (Propositions 1 and 3). Typically, funds may charge investors management 
fees as a proportion of the total assets value, and performance fees, paid if the return of 
the fund outperforms the one obtained by the benchmark. We already observed that 
performance fees (asymmetric contracts) are not common. Thus, funds charge the 
management fee and use it to compensate the traders and face other operational costs. 
As we previously discussed in the theoretical model, management fees and performance 
fees act in the same direction in terms of influencing trader behavior, and thus the latter 
Perf
Index Mnemonic Index Country OBS Fee Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std.
'ASE' Athens Stock Exchange Greece 36 1 1.75 1.50 0.96 106.09 32.41 161.63 10.72 10.08 5.61
'ASX' FTSE All Share Index UK 256 12 1.17 1.25 0.64 272.97 77.12 607.08 13.04 9.28 11.04
'ATX' Austrian Traded Index Austria 32 7 1.28 1.38 0.66 125.11 61.62 155.37 12.35 9.09 8.45
'CAC' CAC 40 Index France 262 9 1.65 1.50 0.70 227.54 59.68 494.75 10.33 8.82 6.89
'CCMP' NASDAQ US (Nasdaq) 40 6 1.59 1.50 0.96 610.58 38.91 1,848.38 9.54 7.23 6.11
'DAX' DAX Germany 106 4 1.22 1.20 0.56 347.06 92.37 742.08 16.52 13.44 11.45
'DJST' Dow Jones US 227 6 1.53 1.50 0.63 100.29 28.95 295.93 7.07 6.45 4.68
'E100' FTSE EuroGroup 100 Europe 38 3 1.34 1.50 0.61 172.12 47.78 711.57 8.77 8.80 2.09
'IBEX' IBEX35 Spain 215 1 1.45 1.45 0.62 78.21 37.47 142.61 9.06 9.51 4.26
'IBOV' IBOVESPA Brazil 337 61 2.09 2.00 1.77 98.87 32.56 187.31 7.00 5.99 6.26
'INDU' Dow Jones Indust US 47 4 1.92 1.50 1.61 237.01 32.25 953.53 7.98 7.67 3.84
'KLCI' Kuala Lumpur Cap Index Malaysia 122 0 1.45 1.50 0.25 145.13 49.51 225.23 11.11 7.42 9.28
'MEXBOL' Mexico Bolsa Index Mexico 80 0 4.84 5.00 0.72 982.81 373.29 1,963.08 10.49 11.52 5.02
'MID' S&P400 Mid Cap US 46 0 0.80 0.75 0.44 1,522.18 140.02 3,499.62 8.24 7.10 5.10
'NKY' NIKKEI 225 Japan 170 8 1.25 1.20 0.69 13,035.77 150.31 50,786.16 10.82 7.98 7.60
'RAY' Russell 3000 Index US 45 1 0.68 0.63 0.51 664.05 256.58 1,121.88 9.09 8.27 6.10
'REX' Germany REX Total Germany 56 2 0.88 0.70 0.55 210.72 67.01 424.07 18.18 16.79 8.93
'RLG' Russell 1000 Growth US 48 0 0.75 0.72 0.40 1,196.50 357.88 2,113.63 17.99 10.47 18.19
'RLV' Russell 1000 Value US 65 0 0.74 0.66 0.53 2,275.07 434.88 6,932.95 13.98 7.59 17.90
'RTY' Russell 2000 US US 182 10 1.06 1.00 0.50 858.81 150.41 3,301.48 10.65 8.92 8.56
'SENSEX' Mumbai Stock Index India 72 0 1.07 1.19 0.26 4,241.40 932.46 7,279.66 9.61 9.04 3.87
'SET' Stock Exchange of Thailand Thailand 126 2 1.29 1.50 0.34 706.07 286.15 1,580.99 8.59 9.55 4.73
'SPX' S&P500 US 1332 98 1.05 0.85 0.75 1,265.58 101.55 7,437.18 11.85 8.61 11.00
'TPX' Topix Index Japan 427 19 1.28 1.48 0.50 14,521.65 1,792.00 60,286.21 8.32 7.02 6.02
'TWSE' Taiwan Stock Exchange China 109 2 1.48 1.60 0.25 1,454.02 897.58 1,565.13 10.58 9.32 3.88
'UKX' UK Index UK 107 5 1.47 1.50 0.63 91.10 13.32 272.76 9.05 8.69 4.70
All 4584 261 1.36 1.25 0.97 10.55 8.36 9.03
Management Fee Total Assets Age
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is not really a requirement. We expect that passive funds charge lower management fees 
as they use it to set the trader’s base salary (β), since incentives (α) are not necessary. 
Table 5 provides the average mean of the management fee for the funds for each 
benchmark, distinguishing between active and passive16 funds. The last column shows 
the t statistics and p-values for the differences among means.  
Table 5 Passive vs. Active Funds: Management Fee 
Management fees for active and passive funds for the various benchmarks considered. Indices with less 
than 10 passive funds were excluded from the analysis. The management fee is non-negative by definition 
and in this case we run the test on the natural logarithm of the measure in order to improve the normality 
of the variable. 
Index Passive Active t-stat p-value
'ASX' 0.88 1.18 2.00 0.05
'CAC' 1.39 1.68 3.27 0.00
'DAX' 0.86 1.25 3.29 0.00
'DJST' 1.57 1.52 0.17 0.86
'IBEX' 1.25 1.46 0.39 0.70
'IBOV' 2.07 2.09 0.15 0.88
'INDU' 0.81 2.19 0.41 0.69
'KLCI' 1.33 1.46 1.55 0.12
'MEXBOL' 4.21 4.14 -0.20 0.84
'MID' 0.42 0.88 0.51 0.61
'NKY' 0.78 1.58 4.04 0.00
'RTY' 0.40 1.10 3.91 0.00
'SPX' 0.66 1.08 3.71 0.00
'TPX' 0.56 1.38 7.90 0.00
'UKX' 1.18 1.52 0.04 0.97
All 1.06 1.37 3.57 0.00
Management Fee t-Test
 
From the results, it can be seen that active funds charged higher management 
fees in 14 of the 16 cases and that this difference is significant at the 5% level in 7 of the 
16 indices considered. If we consider the entire sample of mutual funds (All), evidence 
suggests that active funds charge higher fees. In this sense, propositions 1 and 3 are 
given empirical support, and the level of the management fee for passive funds can be 
used as a proxy for the base compensation considered in the model. For instance, 
considering the benchmark SPX, funds charge 0.66% of the total assets value to pay the 
                                                 
16 Passive funds are the mutual funds classified as Index Funds by Bloomberg. 
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trader’s base salary and other operational costs, and any increments on the management 
fee are used as incentives17.  
Consider the implications of proposition 2, which implies that in general, active 
managed funds assume a higher risk than passive funds (passive fund managers are risk 
averse). Recall, that the risk we are considering in the model is relative to the 
benchmark (tracking error). We use the variable ( )21−β  as a proxy of the tracking 
error18. Table 6 provides the average mean of the previous risk variable for the funds for 
each benchmark, distinguishing between active and passive funds. We considered both 
a short term beta calculated over the previous 6 months (using daily data) and a long 
term beta calculated over the previous 2 years (using monthly data). 
The results indicate that both the short-term and long-term tracking error for 
passive funds are lower than for active funds, as predicted by proposition 219. The 
difference is statistically significant (5% level) for 22 out of 32 cases. If we consider the 
entire sample, the results are similar.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 In the case of benchmarks DJST (US) and MEXBOL (Mexico), the management fee for passive funds 
is higher than for active funds; however the difference is not statistically significant. 
18 This proxy is valid if we assume CAPM and the same market portfolio (benchmark) for all funds. 
( ) 221 BenchTE σβ −= . (Carroll et al., 1992) 
19 The two indexes where the tracking error was greater for passive funds than for active funds is in the 
case of the Dow Jones Industrial Index (INDU) (the difference is not significant) and in the case of 
MEXBOL (significant difference). 
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Table 6 Passive vs. Active Funds: Tracking Error 
The tracking error proxy ( )21−β  for active and passive funds for the various benchmarks considered. 
Indices with less than 10 passive funds were excluded from the analysis. The proxy used was non-
negative by definition, and in this case we run the test on the natural logarithm of the measure in order to 
improve the normality of the variable. 
Index Passive Active t-stat p-value Passive Active t-stat p-value
'ASX' 0.05 0.12 2.04 0.04 0.03 0.08 1.24 0.22
'CAC' 0.07 0.17 3.23 0.00 0.07 0.16 2.34 0.02
'DAX' 0.08 0.11 1.09 0.28 0.05 0.08 1.48 0.14
'DJST' 0.11 0.15 2.48 0.01 0.07 0.11 1.38 0.17
'IBEX' 0.00 0.12 6.03 0.00 0.00 0.10 5.42 0.00
'IBOV' 0.07 0.13 2.57 0.01 0.00 0.04 3.37 0.00
'INDU' 0.11 0.09 -0.57 0.57 0.22 0.38 -0.69 0.49
'KLCI' 0.02 0.07 2.18 0.03 0.01 0.07 3.17 0.00
'MEXBOL' 0.40 0.26 -2.52 0.01 0.02 0.16 3.93 0.00
'MID' 0.02 0.18 1.92 0.06 0.06 0.26 -0.79 0.44
'NKY' 0.06 0.21 14.28 0.00 0.05 0.12 15.88 0.00
'RTY' 0.05 0.12 10.63 0.00 0.13 0.13 -1.76 0.08
'SPX' 0.08 0.13 7.23 0.00 0.07 0.11 7.73 0.00
'TPX' 0.01 0.09 16.27 0.00 0.00 0.05 15.39 0.00
'UKX' 0.02 0.07 11.15 0.00 0.07 0.14 1.16 0.25
All 0.08 0.13 13.84 0.00 0.05 0.10 19.24 0.00
(Beta6M - 1)^2 t-Test (Beta2Y - 1)^2 t-Test
 
From our model (proposition 4), the relationship between incentives and risk 
depends upon the likelihood of outperforming the benchmark. In order to test this, we 
assume that, considering the sample of funds for each benchmark, the group of funds 
with better past-performance is more likely to frame a gain situation and so risk and 
incentives should have a negative relationship. On the other hand, the group of funds 
with the worse past-performance is more likely to frame a loss situation and act in a risk 
seeking way (risk and incentives should have a positive relationship). In this sense, we 
evaluated both the short term and long term relative risk strategies of the fund 
managers.  
For the short term strategy we considered the returns in the first half of the year. 
The funds classified as winners are those with a previous return in the top 25% 
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percentile, and the losers are those with returns in the bottom 25%20. We then 
regressed21 the following 6-month tracking error, taking the management fee as the 
explanatory variable, as follows22: 
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where i is the reference the fund, N is the number of funds for a specific benchmark, C0, 
C1 and C2 are the regression coefficients, β  is the 6-month beta for the second half of 
the year, mf is the fund’s management fee, dl is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
fund is a loser (considering the past 6 month return) and zero otherwise, and dw is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the fund is a winner (considering the past 6 month 
return) and zero otherwise. This is a cross-sectional regression for all funds in each 
benchmark index. The results are presented in Table 7. 
 We can observe that C1 is positive in 24 out of 26 cases and significant in 14 
cases. C2 is negative in 12 out of 26 cases and significant in 11 out of 26. Therefore the 
data suggest that for loser funds, the relationship between incentives and risk is positive, 
and for winners this relationship is negative. The empirical results give some support to 
proposition 4, especially in the case of loser funds. However, both C1 and C2 were 
significant with the expected signs in only four cases.  
 
 
                                                 
20 This definition for the dummy variables will be the same for the remaining regressions. Observe that 
they are not complementary as there are funds which are classified neither as losers nor as winners. 
21 We used White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. 
22 Our measure of tracking error is non-negative by definition and then we run the regression on the 
natural logarithm of the measure in order to improve the normality of the residuals 
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Table 7 Active Funds: Short Term Tracking Error 
Tracking error proxy ( )21−β  for active funds for the various benchmarks considered. The explanatory 
variables are management fee and dummies for past performance which equals 1 if the fund is a loser 
(considering the past 6-months return) and zero otherwise, and equals 1 if the fund is a winner 
(considering the past 6-months return) and zero otherwise. 
Index C0 p-value C1 p-value C2 p-value R2
'ASE' -3.27 0.00 0.00 0.99 -0.26 0.12 0.03
'ASX' -2.76 0.00 0.23 0.08 0.09 0.44 0.01
'ATX' -1.00 0.00 0.06 0.56 0.05 0.62 0.01
'CAC' -4.29 0.00 1.22 0.00 -0.60 0.20 0.14
'CCMP' -2.78 0.00 0.28 0.01 -0.03 0.90 0.05
'DAX' -3.27 0.00 0.75 0.02 0.42 0.15 0.05
'DJST' -3.84 0.00 1.12 0.00 0.65 0.01 0.10
'E100' -2.26 0.00 0.84 0.01 -0.62 0.02 0.25
'IBEX' -4.29 0.00 1.87 0.00 -1.48 0.00 0.34
'IBOV' -2.39 0.00 0.03 0.25 0.16 0.00 0.08
'INDU' -2.25 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.24 0.13 0.06
'KLCI' -3.88 0.00 0.48 0.12 -1.33 0.00 0.19
'MEXBOL' -1.16 0.00 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.08 0.03
'MID' -5.34 0.00 0.83 0.36 -0.97 0.61 0.03
'NKY' -1.69 0.00 0.07 0.39 -0.56 0.05 0.15
'RAY' -4.38 0.00 0.88 0.16 0.28 0.59 0.02
'REX' -0.76 0.00 -0.01 0.65 -0.06 0.45 0.06
'RLG' -5.92 0.00 2.11 0.00 -0.46 0.74 0.19
'RLV' -6.76 0.00 1.73 0.00 1.48 0.03 0.09
'RTY' -4.49 0.00 0.48 0.15 0.30 0.39 0.01
'SENSEX' -4.37 0.00 0.87 0.04 -0.95 0.10 0.15
'SET' -6.08 0.00 -0.12 0.86 0.43 0.59 0.01
'SPX' -4.06 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.04
'TPX' -5.96 0.00 1.18 0.00 0.55 0.11 0.05
'TWSE' -6.36 0.00 1.24 0.00 -0.38 0.31 0.11
'UKX' -2.54 0.00 0.47 0.07 0.13 0.68 0.04
 
For the long term strategy we considered the returns obtained in the first 2 years 
of the last 4 years, and classified them as winners and losers, depending on whether the 
fund was in the top 25% or in the bottom 25% of funds. We then regressed the tracking 
error for the following 2 years taking the management fee as the explanatory variable, 
as follows: 
( )
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where i refers to the fund, N is the number of funds for a specific benchmark, C0, C1 and 
C2 are the regression coefficients, β  is the 2 years beta for the last 2 years, mf is the 
fund’s management fee, dl is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the fund is a loser 
(considering the past 2 years return) and zero otherwise, and dw is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if the fund is a winner (considering the past 2 years return) and zero 
otherwise. This is a cross sectional regression for all funds in each benchmark index. 
The results are presented in the following Table. 
Table 8 Active Funds: Long Term Tracking Error 
Tracking error proxy ( )21−β  for active funds for the various benchmarks considered. The explanatory 
variables are the management fee and dummy variables for past performance, which equal 1 if the fund is 
a loser (considering the past 2 years return) and equal 1 if the fund is a winner (considering the past 2 
years return).  
Index C0 p-value C1 p-value C2 p-value R2
'ASE' -3.35 0.00 0.13 0.64 -0.33 0.21 0.05
'ASX' -4.44 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.13
'ATX' -1.65 0.00 0.47 0.01 -1.53 0.00 0.60
'CAC' -4.55 0.00 1.45 0.00 0.31 0.18 0.30
'CCMP' -4.14 0.00 0.72 0.03 0.28 0.56 0.08
'DAX' -3.70 0.00 1.04 0.00 -0.28 0.33 0.13
'DJST' -3.99 0.00 0.92 0.00 -0.05 0.85 0.10
'E100' -3.22 0.00 1.38 0.00 0.23 0.51 0.17
'IBEX' -4.44 0.00 1.79 0.00 -1.00 0.00 0.30
'IBOV' -5.53 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.09
'INDU' -2.53 0.00 0.25 0.09 -0.98 0.21 0.13
'KLCI' -3.99 0.00 0.52 0.09 -0.39 0.28 0.07
'MEXBOL' -2.71 0.00 0.11 0.30 -0.11 0.18 0.06
'MID' -4.53 0.00 -0.38 0.67 0.89 0.53 0.04
'NKY' -2.47 0.00 0.11 0.38 -0.12 0.44 0.02
'RAY' -4.51 0.00 1.49 0.00 -0.75 0.59 0.18
'REX' -0.78 0.00 -0.24 0.16 -0.05 0.34 0.24
'RLG' -6.51 0.00 1.87 0.00 2.23 0.01 0.18
'RLV' -7.16 0.00 2.80 0.00 1.29 0.03 0.14
'RTY' -3.76 0.00 0.09 0.67 -0.15 0.68 0.00
'SENSEX' -5.79 0.00 0.99 0.29 -0.41 0.45 0.05
'SET' -6.56 0.00 1.87 0.00 1.23 0.05 0.21
'SPX' -4.25 0.00 1.20 0.00 0.08 0.69 0.13
'TPX' -5.52 0.00 1.40 0.00 -0.12 0.62 0.10
'TWSE' -4.42 0.00 0.09 0.80 -0.26 0.34 0.01
'UKX' -3.67 0.00 1.04 0.00 -0.25 0.31 0.13
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 We may observe that C1 is positive in 24 out of 26 cases and significant in 16 
cases, while C2 is negative in 16 out of 26 cases and significant in only 2 out of 26. 
Therefore the data suggest that for loser funds, the relationship between incentives and 
risk is positive, but for winners the evidence is weaker. The empirical results give some 
support to proposition 4, especially in the case of loser funds. However, only in two 
cases are both C1 and C2 significant with the expected signs.  
If we add to control variables for size and the age23 of the fund the regression  as 
the following equation: 
( )
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 we reach the results presented in Table 9: 
C1 is positive in 24 out of 26 cases and significant in 17 cases, while C2 is 
negative in 17 out of 26 cases and significant in only 5 out of 26. Results are similar to 
Table 8. The empirical results give some support to proposition 4, especially in the case 
of loser funds. However, only in three cases are both C1 and C2 significant with the 
expected signs. Also, C3 is negative (positive) in 16 (10) out of 26 cases and significant 
in 4 (3) cases, so no clear pattern emerges. C4 is negative in 19 out of 26 cases and 
significant in 10 out of 26, which suggests that smaller funds have larger tracking 
errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 We actually used the natural logarithm of age and size. 
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Table 9 Active Funds: Long Term Tracking Error 
Tracking error proxy ( )21−β  for active funds for the various benchmarks considered. The explanatory 
variables are the management fee and the dummy variables for past performance which equal 1 if the 
fund is a loser (considering the past 2 years return) and zero otherwise, and equal 1 if the fund is a winner 
(considering the past 2 years return) and zero otherwise. Control variables for log(age) and log(size) are 
included.  
Index C0 p-value C1 p-value C2 p-value C3 p-value C4 p-value R2
'ASE' -3.94 0.00 0.16 0.48 -0.13 0.63 0.94 0.09 -0.45 0.01 0.23
'ASX' -3.73 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.21 0.40 -0.27 0.02 0.16
'ATX' -1.63 0.01 0.53 0.03 -1.66 0.00 -0.43 0.22 0.26 0.04 0.66
'CAC' -3.22 0.00 1.33 0.00 0.32 0.16 -0.18 0.60 -0.19 0.06 0.32
'CCMP' -1.67 0.47 0.76 0.04 0.20 0.69 -1.46 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.17
'DAX' -2.26 0.06 0.90 0.00 -0.21 0.52 -0.53 0.19 0.00 0.98 0.15
'DJST' -1.62 0.08 0.82 0.00 -0.19 0.52 -1.01 0.00 -0.03 0.76 0.14
'E100' -7.45 0.01 1.42 0.00 0.34 0.33 2.10 0.05 -0.09 0.73 0.25
'IBEX' -4.47 0.00 1.81 0.00 -0.76 0.01 0.61 0.31 -0.40 0.02 0.33
'IBOV' -3.51 0.00 0.41 0.00 -0.06 0.55 -0.87 0.01 -0.02 0.79 0.13
'INDU' -1.94 0.23 0.26 0.08 -1.02 0.19 0.46 0.55 -0.43 0.29 0.23
'KLCI' -2.94 0.00 0.37 0.28 -0.39 0.29 -0.03 0.91 -0.23 0.01 0.13
'MEXBOL' -1.40 0.10 0.21 0.05 -0.11 0.14 -0.94 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.17
'MID' -5.60 0.00 -0.58 0.52 1.10 0.46 0.91 0.09 -0.16 0.27 0.10
'NKY' -1.22 0.05 0.04 0.73 -0.10 0.56 -0.42 0.09 -0.06 0.46 0.10
'RAY' -3.21 0.14 0.70 0.03 -1.26 0.30 1.23 0.16 -0.70 0.00 0.34
'REX' -1.04 0.00 -0.25 0.10 -0.01 0.61 0.13 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.33
'RLG' -3.66 0.05 1.46 0.01 1.95 0.01 -0.73 0.26 -0.13 0.51 0.24
'RLV' -5.06 0.01 2.29 0.00 0.91 0.15 -0.01 0.98 -0.31 0.17 0.17
'RTY' -1.27 0.08 -0.08 0.74 -0.27 0.45 -0.75 0.01 -0.12 0.13 0.07
'SENSEX' -5.28 0.04 0.94 0.31 -1.03 0.07 -1.38 0.22 0.40 0.06 0.11
'SET' -3.84 0.39 1.25 0.05 1.91 0.02 -2.28 0.11 0.45 0.36 0.27
'SPX' -2.16 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.06 0.76 -0.27 0.08 -0.28 0.00 0.20
'TPX' -6.61 0.00 1.04 0.00 -0.17 0.51 1.30 0.00 -0.23 0.00 0.17
'TWSE' -5.13 0.01 0.11 0.73 -0.26 0.33 0.09 0.86 0.07 0.71 0.01
'UKX' -0.29 0.84 0.82 0.01 -0.48 0.05 -0.97 0.12 -0.29 0.08 0.26  
 The previous result sheds light on the problem of relating incentives to risk 
taking behavior, indicating that the mixed results found in previous empirical papers are 
probably due to a framing problem. Sensoy (2006) found that tracking error is greater, 
among funds with stronger incentives, while the agency theory predicts a negative 
relationship. The relationship between incentives and risk seems to depend on the 
reference, and this result is robust over various financial markets (developed and 
emerging markets). The asymmetry in the risk taking behavior is likely to be an 
invariant of the decision making process. Another interesting result is that typically the 
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coefficient for C1 is higher than that for C2, indicating the loss of aversion in human 
behavior24.  
 Empirical studies of incentives and risk taking in the literature typically test if 
funds with poor performance in the first half of the year increase risk in the second half 
of the year (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). In the framework of prospect theory, this will 
happen because loss averse managers will always increase risk as their wealth drops 
below the threshold, and this effect will be more pronounced for funds with higher fees. 
 Related to proposition 5, we implemented the following cross-sectional 
regression: 
( ) iiii dwCdlCC εβ +⋅+⋅+=− 21021log  
, where C0, C1 and C2 are the regression coefficients, β  is the 6 month beta for the 
second half of the year, dl is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the fund is a loser 
(considering the past 6 month return), and dw is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
fund is a winner (considering the past 6 month return). The results are presented in 
Table 10. 
 Typically, we verify the relationship that a fund increases the risk if it under 
performs in the first half of the year and decreases risk if it outperforms.  This supports 
proposition 5, and is in line with other empirical papers (Elton et al., 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 The mean value for abs(C1) in Table 7 is 0.69 while that of abs(C2) is 0.51 (the p value for the 
difference = 0.05). 
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Table 10 Active Funds: Short Term Tracking Error 
Tracking error proxy ( )21−β  for active funds for the various benchmarks considered. The explanatory 
variables are dummies for past performance which equals 1 if the fund is a loser (considering the past 6 
month return) and equals 1 if the fund is a winner (considering the past 6 month return).  
Index C0 p-value C1 p-value C2 p-value R2
'ASE' -3.68 0.00 1.21 0.05 0.01 0.96 0.20
'ASX' -2.70 0.00 0.21 0.29 -0.04 0.82 0.01
'ATX' -1.03 0.00 0.16 0.43 0.10 0.59 0.02
'CAC' -4.09 0.00 2.38 0.00 -1.55 0.04 0.17
'CCMP' -2.61 0.00 0.35 0.50 -0.52 0.52 0.04
'DAX' -3.56 0.00 1.66 0.00 0.93 0.04 0.11
'DJST' -3.99 0.00 2.05 0.00 1.14 0.02 0.12
'E100' -2.43 0.00 1.29 0.01 -0.86 0.12 0.26
'IBEX' -4.23 0.00 2.83 0.00 -2.95 0.00 0.44
'IBOV' -2.42 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.52 0.00 0.13
'INDU' -2.34 0.00 0.92 0.27 0.50 0.34 0.05
'KLCI' -3.94 0.00 0.83 0.06 -1.93 0.00 0.19
'MEXBOL' -1.14 0.00 0.15 0.48 0.22 0.10 0.02
'MID' -5.21 0.00 0.48 0.58 -1.09 0.48 0.04
'NKY' -1.61 0.00 0.04 0.77 -1.03 0.02 0.19
'RAY' -4.21 0.00 0.91 0.29 -0.68 0.46 0.05
'REX' -0.76 0.00 -0.03 0.11 -0.07 0.30 0.04
'RLG' -5.76 0.00 2.14 0.00 -1.10 0.24 0.22
'RLV' -7.10 0.00 2.20 0.03 1.46 0.11 0.08
'RTY' -4.26 0.00 0.19 0.67 -0.26 0.59 0.00
'SENSEX' -4.48 0.00 1.27 0.01 -0.94 0.14 0.17
'SET' -6.18 0.00 0.14 0.88 0.72 0.57 0.01
'SPX' -3.66 0.00 0.21 0.28 -0.33 0.11 0.01
'TPX' -6.33 0.00 2.35 0.00 1.44 0.00 0.09
'TWSE' -6.57 0.00 2.33 0.00 -0.38 0.51 0.16
'UKX' -2.43 0.00 0.52 0.27 -0.10 0.85 0.02
 
 Finally, in terms of the use of the performance fee, we already commented that it 
is not common in the sample and that less than 6% of funds use this fee. However, for 
Brazil (IBOVESPA) and the United States (S&P500), we could observe more funds 
using the performance fee. From the model, funds with a performance fee should have a 
higher tracking error. We tested this for the previous two indices and found supportive 
results25.  
                                                 
25 Funds that use performance fees have a higher tracking error, indicating that the performance fee acts 
to magnify the management fee. 
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2.5.  Conclusions  
 
 In this study we applied the Behavior Agent Model to the professional investor 
environment, using the theory of contracts, and focused on the situation of active or 
passive investment strategies. In a deductive way, we formulated five propositions 
linking investment strategy, compensation and risk taking in a professional investor’s 
context.  
 Our propositions suggest that managers in passively managed funds tend to be 
rewarded without incentive fee and are risk averse. On the other hand, in actively 
managed funds, whether incentives that reduce or increase the riskiness of the fund 
depends on how hard it is to outperform the benchmark. If the fund is likely to 
outperform the benchmark, incentives reduce the manager’s risk appetite; conversely, if 
the benchmark is unlikely to be outperformed, incentives increase the manager’s risk 
appetite. Furthermore, the evaluative horizon influences the trader’s risk preferences, in 
the sense that if traders performed poorly in a period, they tend to choose riskier 
investments in the following period given the same evaluative horizon.  On the other 
hand, more conservative investments are chosen after a period of good performance by 
a trader. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time these results have been 
illustrated in the literature using a behavioral framework.  
We tested the model in an empirical analysis over a large world sample of 
mutual equity funds, including developed and emerging markets, and we reached 
supportive results to the propositions established in the theoretical model.  
 Further extensions of this work may include the type of financial institution the 
trader works for (banks, insurance companies, pension funds) to take into account 
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regulatory and institutional effects. Also, delegated portfolio management often 
involves more than one agency layer and future work could examine how this feature 
affects incentives? More generally, studies about general equilibrium implications and 
price impact should be interesting, especially for policy-makers, given the relevance of 
these funds in all developed financial markets. Also, the consideration of other contract 
schemes should be of interest (Sundaram and Yermack, 2006, suggest the use of debt 
contracts). Indeed, Manthei and Mohnen (2004) show that factors other than the 
performance-dependent part of the compensation influence an individual’s effort 
decision. Their experimental data show significantly higher effort levels for very low or 
very high fixed payments. 
Despite the fact that we use prospect theory assumptions, the impact of cognitive 
biases in an agent’s risk preference still needs to be better understood in order to 
understand the way psychological states may affect risk preferences in this context. We 
applied BAM specifically to the trader’s situation. An extension of this study to other 
institutional contexts would be interesting in order to find some external validity to the 
propositions settled. Also, in the compensation analysis, only financial compensations 
were considered, and we think that including non-financial rewards like recognition and 
prestige would enrich the theory and enable better predictions. Finally, inclusion of 
career concerns in the model could also improve multi-period analysis. Kempf et al. 
(2007) suggest that when employment risk is high, managers that lag behind tend to 
decrease risk relative to leading managers in order to prevent potential job loss. All of 
these aspects are left for future research. 
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Chapter Three 
 
House-Money and Disposition Effect Overseas: An 
Experimental Approach 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Behavioral concepts have been used to provide explanations for several financial 
market inefficiencies found in empirical studies. Behavioral economists argue that the 
prospect of losses seems more damaging than looking at the entire wealth, even if the 
average outcome is the same. This sort of myopia in the face of losses may explain 
much of the irrationality some agents display in financial markets.  
In this sense, several empirical studies (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) have 
shown that when dealing with gains, agents are risk averse, but when choices involve 
losses, agents are risk seeking. Moreover in a wide variety of domains, people are 
significantly more averse to losses than they are attracted to same-sized gains (Rabin, 
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1998). Loss aversion is a relevant psychological concept that has been imported to 
financial and economic analysis, which represents the foundation of prospect theory26. 
In the finance literature, there are conflicting results about the effect of prior 
outcomes in future risky choices. Thaler and Johnson (1990) show that when faced with 
sequential gambles, people are more risk-taking if they earned money on prior gambles 
than if they lost.  The intuition is that losses are less painful to people when they occur 
after a gain rather than when losses happen after a previous loss. This effect is known in 
the financial literature as the house-money effect. Gneezy et al. (2003) investigate the 
house-money effect in a market experiment, and find a significant positive effect of 
lagged profits on expenditures on assets.  
On the other hand, another stream of the literature based on individuals’ loss 
aversion suggests that subjects take significantly greater risk following a loss than a 
gain (disposition effect)27. Weber and Zuchel (2003) provided empirical evidence of the 
previous risk behavior in his portfolio treatment. In chapter two, in a theoretical study 
about traders' compensation, we proposed that if traders performed poorly in a period, 
they tend to choose riskier investments the following period. However, considering the 
house-money effect, traders who have earned profits in the first period that exceed some 
benchmark level would become less risk averse in the following period, because they 
would feel that they were gambling with the house-money (Coval and Shumway, 2005). 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) proposed another behavioral bias— myopic loss 
aversion (MLA) as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 
1985). MLA combines two behavioral concepts, loss aversion and mental accounting, 
                                                 
26 Coval and Shumway (2005) found strong evidence that traders from the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT) appear highly loss-averse, assuming high afternoon risk to recover from morning losses. 
 
27 The increase in risk taking following a loss is also referred as “escalation of commitment”. 
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where the latter is related to how individuals employ implicit methods to evaluate the 
consequence of their decisions. Myopic Loss Aversion is related to the behavior of 
individuals to evaluate prospects considering a shorter horizon than it should be given 
his original investment horizon. The evaluation period tends to fit to the feedback 
frequency of the financial strategy. 
Gneezy and Potters (1997), Thaler et al. (1997), Gneezy et al. (2003) and Haigh 
and List (2005) have provided experimental evidence supporting MLA28. In their 
experiments, they change the feedback frequency of investment decisions and find that 
agents tend to invest more when the performance of their decisions is assessed more 
infrequently.  
Another relevant aspect addressed in this paper is that behavioral economic 
research has tended to ignore the role of country differences in financial and economic 
decision-making, usually making universalistic assumptions of human behavior. As 
pointed out by Levinson and Peng (2007), despite the progress of behavioral economics 
and its increasing importance in explaining international financial markets, behavior 
theory has failed to answer how do systematic cultural and social differences affect 
economic, financial, and legal decision-making. Under cultural psychology, people 
perceive life through different lenses and interact with diverse environment. It’s 
expected that this fact might affect individuals’ decision making process. 
The objective of this Chapter is twofold: first to verify the existence of myopic 
loss aversion across countries; and second to clarify which effect is dominant in a 
                                                 
28 The reader is also referred to Langer and Weber (2005), who extend the concept of myopic loss 
aversion to myopic prospect theory, predicting that for specific risk profiles, where the chance of winning 
is much high, myopia will not decrease, but increase the attractiveness of a sequence. 
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dynamic setting: loss aversion or house-money. We test the house-money effect 
following Thaler and Johnson (1990), and find strong evidence of it. We then modify 
the experiment conducted in Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Haigh and List (2005) to 
test which effect is dominant: the house-money effect or the disposition effect. This 
experiment was conducted on students in Brazil and Spain, and results suggest that loss 
aversion dominates the house-money effect. Therefore, in an experiment that replicates 
the dynamics of decision making, the house-money effect disappears. We also report 
supportive results related to existence of myopic loss aversion (MLA) across countries 
(Brazil and Spain). 
The chosen countries, despite their economic differences, have similar cultural 
characteristics. Gouveia and Clemente (2000) have shown that Brazil and Spain are 
similar in terms of the level of individualism-collectivism, with Spanish people been 
slightly more individualists.  
In a framework close to ours, Weber and Zuchel (2003) investigate the influence 
of prior outcomes on risk attitude. They found that the prospect presentation might 
influence the risk attitude of subjects after prior outcomes. They observed that in the 
“portfolio treatment”, subjects take significantly greater risk following a loss than a 
gain. On the other hand, in the “lottery treatment,” there was greater risk taking after a 
gain than after a loss. However, in their experiment, subjects participated in only one 
sequence of two periods, so they were not given the opportunity to learn by 
participating in several rounds. This could influence the perception of the subjects about 
the likelihood of the outcomes (law of small numbers). Also, their within-subject design 
aiming to get the impact of prior outcomes is unnatural and unrealistic. There’s clearly a 
difference in asking for the behavior of a subject in the face of gains or losses; and the 
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direct observation of his attitude facing risky dynamic decisions. Our experimental 
design overcomes these previous limitations. 
The remainder of this Chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we 
provide brief theoretical background of loss aversion, MLA and house-money effects. 
In section 3 we describe our experimental design. In section 4 we present the results and 
section 5 concludes the chapter, highlighting the main findings. 
 
3.2. Theoretical Background 
 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) were the first to propose the myopic loss aversion 
(MLA) concept to elucidate the equity premium puzzle raised by Mehra and Prescott 
(1985). This puzzle refers to the fact that despite stocks have provided a more favorable 
risk-return profile; investors were still willing to buy bonds. Benartzi and Thaler took 
advantage of two behavioral concepts to solve the puzzle: loss aversion and mental 
accounting. They included the impact of anticipated emotions on decision-making. 
Anticipated emotions are those that decision-makers expect to experience given a 
certain outcome. They demonstrated that the size of the equity premium is consistent 
with the investors evaluating their investments annually, and weighting losses about 
twice as heavily as gains.  
The approach of Benartzi and Thaler (1995) was not direct (experimental) 
evidence of MLA. However, Gneezy and Potters (1997) conducted an experiment that 
produced evidence to support the behavioral hypothesis of myopic loss aversion. Haigh 
and List (2005), in another experiment with undergraduate students and traders from the 
CBOT, in a design similar to the one proposed by Gneezy and Potters (1997), found 
evidence of myopic loss aversion (MLA), and that traders exhibit behavior consistent 
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with MLA to a greater extent than students. In the experiment, they evaluated the 
participation of the agents in a certain lottery, changing the frequency of information 
provided to them. Bellamare et al. (2005), in another experiment similar to Gneezy and 
Potters (1997), distinguish the effects of information feedback and investment flexibility 
over the myopic loss aversion. They found that varying the amount of information, 
alone, suffices to induce the behavior that is in line with the myopic loss aversion.  
However, Langer and Weber (2003) found a strong MLA effect depending on 
the length of commitment, a much less pronounced effect of feedback, and a strong 
interaction between both variables. The effect of the feedback frequency was reversed 
for a long binding period. Huang and Liu (2007) suggest that an investor with a higher 
risk aversion or a longer investment horizon chooses less frequent but more accurate 
periodic news updates. Charness and Gneezy (2003) found that myopic loss aversion 
treatment participants were willing to pay money to have more freedom to choose, even 
though (in line with the documented bias) they invested less when having more freedom 
to change their investment. 
There is ample evidence that feelings do significantly influence decision-
making, especially when the decision involves conditions of risk or uncertainty (see 
Lucey and Dowling (2005) for a recent review). The consideration of risk as feeling can 
be presented as in the figure 1. The idea is to incorporate the fact that the emotions 
people experience at the time of making a decision influence their eventual decision. 
Edmans et al. (2007) find significant market decline after soccer losses, which is 
assumed to affect negatively the investors’ mood. Supported by psychologist’s research, 
the risk as feeling model is based on three premises: cognitive evaluations induce 
emotional reactions; emotions inform cognitive evaluations; and feelings can affect 
behavior.  
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In our study, we extend the previous model, by considering a multi-period 
analysis, suggesting a feedback process in which the experienced outcomes 
(experienced utility), whether they were positive or negative, will influence the 
following decision-making process (decision utility) inducing a different risk taking 
behavior. In other words, realized outcomes have an impact on the anticipated 
outcomes, emotions and subject probabilities; which will deviate the risk taking 
decision of the subject from what is predicted by standard utility functions.  
Figure 1 
Risk as Feelings framework 
 Note: Adapted from Lucey and Dowling, 2005. 
The reasons why decision utility and experienced utility fail to coincide are 
related to the following empirical facts: the financial decisions are cognitively hard to 
make; people usually have poor forecasts of preference dynamics (failure to anticipate 
adaptation and visceral effects); and individuals have inaccurate memories of past 
hedonic experiences.  
Anticipated 
outcomes or 
emotions 
Subjective 
probabilities 
Extra factors 
(mood, 
vividness, etc.) 
Cognitive 
evaluation 
Feelings 
Decisions Outcomes 
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Assume the following example to highlight the influence of MLA in the 
individual decision making process. Suppose an agent is loss averse, and weights losses 
relative to gains at a rate of λ > 1. Consider also that the agent is evaluating the 
possibility of taking part in a lottery, in which he has probability p of losing $L, and 
probability (1 – p) of winning $W. So the expected utility of the lottery is 
( ) )())(1(1 LpWpUE −+−= λ , and the agent should accept the gamble if E(U1) > 0 or 
)(
))(1(
Lp
Wp−<λ . Now, if the agent is evaluating the possibility of participating in an n-
round lottery, each with the same payoff as the previous one, the expected utility is now 
given by: 
( ) )()(...)1]()1[()1( 1 nLpppLWnpnWUE nnnn −++−−−+−= − λλ .           (Eq. 01) 
For instance, for values n =1, L= 1, p= 2/3 and W =2.5, the agent should accept the 
gamble if λ < 1.25. When n =3 the agent should accept the gamble if λ < 1.56. As the 
number of rounds in the lottery increases, the gamble becomes more attractive to 
increasingly loss-averse agents. 
 Translating the previous framework to the financial market, if agents evaluate 
their investments more often, there will be more occasions when the risky asset (stocks) 
underperforms the safe asset (bonds). As individuals are loss averse, those occasions 
would generate to them a greater dissatisfaction, so they will tend to avoid the risky 
asset. Conversely, if agents evaluate their investments over longer time periods, the 
risky asset will rarely under perform the safe asset, and the investors will face losses 
more seldom. In this case, the loss averse agent will be more comfortable taking more 
risk. 
Hypothesis 1(MLA): Within a dynamic environment, decision makers who receive 
feedback more (less) often will take less (more) risk. 
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The house-money effect, proposed in Thaler and Johnson (1990), suggests that 
the risk tolerance of an agent increases as his wealth increases as a consequence of 
previous gains. To explain this effect, they developed Quasi-Hedonic Editing (QHE) 
Theory, which considers that decision makers segregate recent gains from their initial 
position, but they do not segregate recent losses. Because they have segregated their 
prior winnings from their initial wealth, future losses will appear less damaging, as they 
are losing someone else's money (the house-money). Slattery and Ganster (2002) found 
that decision maker who had failed to reach their goals, set lower, less risky goals in 
subsequent decisions.  
On the other hand, disposition effect would predict that traders with profitable 
mornings would reduce their exposure to afternoon risk trying to avoid losses and so 
guaranteeing the previous gains. One major explanation for this effect is based on the 
value function and loss aversion from prospect theory. When subjects use the wealth 
they bring to the experiment plus any initial endowment in the experiment as reference 
point, any loss in the experiment will be perceived as a loss, not as a reduced gain as in 
the hedonic-editing case. The intuition is that, due to the convex shape of the value 
function in the range of losses, risk-seeking behavior will prevail in the case of prior 
losses. As empirical evidence of the previous effect, Odean (1998) and Weber and 
Camerer (1998) have shown that investors are more willing to sell stocks that trade 
above the purchase price (winners) than stocks that trade below purchase price (losers) 
– disposition effect. Both works interpreted this behavior as evidence of decreased risk 
aversion after a loss, and increased risk aversion after a gain. 
It’s important to highlight that myopic loss aversion describes the bias when 
evaluating a prospect before taking an investment decision, while house-money and loss 
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aversion (as considered here in a dynamic setting) describe behavioral biases after 
persons experienced gains or losses. We evaluate both situations in this work.  
Ackert et al. (2006) pointed out the previous contradiction between loss aversion 
and house-money, however they argue that prospect theory was developed for one-shot 
games, and so it cannot be applied to a multi-period setting. They provide the results of 
a multi-period experiment that gives evidence of house-money instead of disposition 
effect. Nevertheless, the way they test house-money is by changing the initial amount 
given to the subjects, and so the change in the individual wealth is not a result of the 
individual’s choices. We argue here, based on the risk as feeling ideas, that an 
experienced outcome will impact future individual’s decisions, and so we could 
perfectly observe the disposition effect. In this study, we want to address the influence 
of previous losses (or gains) in future risk-taking decisions. The following two 
competing hypotheses can be formulated, based on disposition and on the house-money 
effect, respectively: 
Hypothesis 2a(DE): Within a dynamic environment, decision makers who receive 
negative (positive) feedback in a period will take more (less) risk in the following 
period. 
Hypothesis 2b(HM): Within a dynamic environment, decision makers who receive 
negative (positive) feedback in a period will take less (more) risk in the following 
period. 
As pointed out by Brennan (2001), the house-money effect is just one of at least 
three behavioral stories about how an investor will respond to good or bad news. Biased 
self-attribution causes the investor to become more confident as his previous positive 
assessment of the investment is confirmed, and therefore, he will be willing to take 
more risk; an effect similar to the one proposed by the house-money effect. On the other 
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hand, the disposition effect suggests that investors become more risk averse as their 
stocks increase in value, in line with the loss aversion prediction.  
Related to MLA, our experimental design is similar to the experiment proposed 
in Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Haigh and List (2005). On the other hand, in order to 
test which effect is dominant, loss aversion or house-money, we introduce a novel 
treatment allowing participants to accumulate previous gains. We explain our 
experiment in depth in the next section. 
In terms of the cross-country analysis, based on psychological theories, it is 
quite plausible that fundamental differences in how people perceive the world might 
predict fundamental differences in how people make financial estimations, economic 
decisions, and exhibit cognitive biases. One prominent theory has helped social 
psychologists explain systematic cultural differences: the individualism/collectivism 
model (Triandis, 1995). In general terms, the individualism conveys two aspects: 
segregation of the individual from the social group which he participates; and self-
confidence. The same happens to collectivism: integration with the social group and 
interdependence.  
Previous psychological studies have related the level of individualism to age 
(Hui and Yee, 1994), gender (Cha, 1994), educational level (Han and Choe, 1994), 
economic level (Freeman, 1997) and economic independency (Kagitçibasi, 1994). Age 
is considered one of the main factors that explain the level of 
individualism/collectivism, in the sense that elder people present a tendency towards 
collectivism. In terms of gender, women are more social and centred in the family, 
when compared to men, and this might explain their higher level of collectivism. The 
educational level has also being shown to influence the level of collectivism. Previous 
researches have described that one with lower educational level is more likely to present 
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friendship actions and favorable attitudes towards a member of his social group. 
Conversely, individuals with a higher educational level usually adopt individualistic 
values. Finally, a collectivism (individualism) model is produced when an economic or 
emotional dependency (independency) is observed.  
The conclusion of previous social psychological studies is that someone who is 
young, man, has a high educational and economic level, and is economic independent, 
tends to be more individualist. Individualism is related to behavioral biases like 
optimism and overconfidence, which leads to less aversion to risk. 
The chosen countries, despite their economic differences, have similar cultural 
characteristics. Gouveia and Clemente (2000) have shown that Brazil and Spain are 
similar in terms of the level of individualism-collectivism, with Spanish people been 
slightly more individualists. The previous difference is probably due to the Spanish 
higher economic level and economic independency. So we would expect Spanish 
subjects to be more comfortable in assuming more risks. Also young and men subjects 
are also supposed to be less risk averse. 
 
3.3. Experiment Design 
 
We have two behavioral biases to investigate: the MLA and the house-money 
(against disposition) effect. To study the MLA effect we followed closely the 
experimental design proposed by Haigh and List (2005). We used a straightforward 2 X 
2 experimental design (see Table 1). With this setting, it’s not only possible to verify the 
existence of MLA, but also to investigate if there’s any country effect. Both groups of 
students were selected from undergraduate courses of Management and Economics. 
Chapter Three: House-Money and Disposition Effect Overseas 
 62
They were evaluated in two distinct treatments: Treatment F (denoting frequent 
feedback) and Treatment I (denoting infrequent feedback).  
Table 1 - Experimental Design (MLA) 
Subject Type Treatment F Treatment I 
Students from Brazil 24 28 
Students from Spain 32 32 
Note: Number of students in each treatment (F: frequent feedback; I: infrequent feedback) grouped by 
country (Brazil and Spain). 
In Treatment F, our control group, subjects took part in a twelve-round lottery. 
In each round, they were endowed with 100 units29 and had to decide how much to bet 
in a lottery, which pays two and a half times the amount invested with one-third of 
probability, and zero with two-thirds of probability. The subjects were previously 
informed about the probabilities, payoffs and mechanism of the lottery, and so they 
were aware that they could win from zero to 35030 in each round, depending on the 
amount invested. At the end of each round they were informed about the lottery results 
and had to decide the next round bet. The experimental instructions for students in each 
treatment are given in the Appendix A. After the twelve rounds, all individual results 
were summed and the final amount was paid. 
In opposite of Treatment F, we used the Treatment I (infrequent feedback), 
which is similar to the frequent treatment, except that subjects place their bets in blocks 
of three. Agents decide just before round t, how much to invest in rounds t, t +1 and t + 
                                                 
29 For subjects in Brazil, 1 unit represents 1 cent of Brazilian Real, and for students in Spain, 1 unit 
represents 1 cent of Euro. 
 
30 If the subject invests 100 and wins, his total earnings would be 100 x 2.5 = 250 + 100 (his initial 
endowment) = 350. 
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2. Following the suggestion made in the literature, we restricted the bets to be 
homogeneous across the three rounds. After all the subjects placed their blocks of bets, 
they were informed about the combined results.  
Based on the MLA effect, it’s expected that students in the Treatment F will 
invest less in the lottery, compared to those in Treatment I, as they face losses more 
often and are loss averse. Subjects in Treatment I face losses less often, and so should 
be willing to take more risk. 
In order to check the house-money effect against loss aversion, we again used a 
2 x 2 experimental design summarized in Table 2. With this setting it’s not only 
possible to verify the existence of loss aversion or house-money, but also to investigate 
if there’s any country effect. As in the previous setting, both groups of students were 
selected from undergraduate courses of Management and Economics. They were 
evaluated in two distinct treatments: Treatment IR (Isolated Results) and Treatment C 
(Cumulative Results).  
Table 2 - Experimental Design (House-Money Effect) 
Subject Type Treatment IR Treatment C 
Students from Brazil 24 33 
Students from Spain 32 33 
Note: Number of students in each treatment (IR: isolated results; C: cumulative results) grouped by 
country (Brazil and Spain). 
In fact, Treatment IR is the same as Treatment F and so the group is the same 
(control group). In opposite of Treatment IR, we used Treatment C (cumulative results), 
which is similar to the IR treatment, except that the amount available to invest in each 
pair round (t = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12) was the result individually obtained in the previous 
round (t = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11) respectively, plus the 100 units corresponding to that 
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round. In this setting, subjects tend to place their reference point in the beginning of 
each two rounds, in opposite to Treatment F where each rounds’ endowment represent 
their reference point. The results were given to the subjects and checked after each 
round.  
The purpose of this novel treatment arrangement is to capture the real effect on 
the subject’s risk preference after perceiving a gain or a loss due to his previous risk 
choice. We argue that this framework can definitely elucidate the house-money, loss 
aversion contradiction. Observe that in Treatment F, the amount available to be invested 
by the subject is the same for all rounds, independent of his choices, while in Treatment 
C, this value is affected by the previous outcome. In other words, the subject is 
effectively experiencing the effects of his previous risky choice. In this framework, very 
close to a real investment decision situation, we expect to distinguish between house-
money and loss aversion.  
 Evidence that past winners invest more in the following period is consistent with 
the house-money effect. Otherwise, we have an indication that the loss aversion effect is 
more relevant, since the past winners are willing to take less risk to avoid future losses. 
It could be argued that the decisions in our proposed economic experiment could be 
distorted, because the money the subjects risk comes from the experimenter, rather than 
their own pockets. However, Clark (2002) found no evidence of the previous distortion, 
suggesting that use of "free" initial money endowments does not have an impact on the 
final experimental results. On the other hand, there are good reasons for supplying 
subjects with starting funds in experiments. Specifically, it facilitates recruitment, and 
allows subjects to make decisions in the realm of losses without leaving the experiment 
in debt. Also, since we are investigating future risk decisions after experiencing a loss 
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(gain), our results tend to be more reinforced than if subjects were using their own 
money.  
Some final remarks about the experiment: we recruited 85 subjects for the 
Brazilian group from the Universidade Católica de Brasília and 97 subjects for the 
Spanish group from the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. The treatment was run from 
January to April 2006, in a classroom in Spain and another in Brazil. Subjects were 
seated apart from each other avoiding communication. No more than 15 students were 
evaluated at a time. Each subject could take part in only one treatment group. All 
treatments were run using pencil and paper. After each round, experimenters circulated 
to check whether the subjects were calculating the payoffs correctly. To determine if a 
subject wins or loses in a round depends on the winning color previously settled for 
each participant: green, yellow or red. If the individual winning color is equal to the one 
randomly defined by the experimenter for that round, the subject wins; otherwise she 
loses. In order to compare our results with the work of Thaler and Johnson (1990), we 
included two questions taken from their questionnaire in our experiment. We also 
included two control variables: sex and age.  
 
3.4. Experiment Results 
 
 The descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in Table 3. In total, we had 
182 subjects taken from Brazil (85 students) and Spain (97 students). In terms of sex 
distribution, the sample is equitative except for Treatment C (Brazil), which had 75.8% 
of men. The average age of the participants was similar across the treatments, with the 
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Brazilian subjects being slightly older. The average earnings in each treatment was 1084 
units (Treatment F), 1076 (Treatment I) and 1611 (Treatment C)31. 
 
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics given for each treatment (F: frequent feedback; I: infrequent feedback; C: 
cumulative results). The Table provides the number of subjects in each group (# Students), the percentage 
of men (% Men), the average age of the students (Avg. Age), and the average bet as a percentage over the 
total amount available for the subject (Avg. Bet).  
 
 
 
 
 The main variable of interest is the amount invested by the students in the 
lottery, since we want to infer their risk aversion (the results for the Treatment C were 
normalized for a range between 0 and 100, to be comparable with the other treatments). 
From Table 3, we observe that the average bet varied from 40.10 to 66.02 among the 
treatment groups. Figure 2 shows the average bets for all groups. To maintain 
consistency with previous literature, we first make a non-parametric analysis of the 
results.  
In line with our predictions, we observe a country effect, with Spanish students 
being less risk averse than Brazilian subjects in all treatment groups. Since MLA 
predicts that subjects in the F treatment should invest less than those in the I treatment, 
we directly observe their means in each country. Related to Brazil, the group F had an 
                                                 
31 Throughout our analysis we considered relative bets in order to evaluate the treatment C under the same 
norm of the remaining treatments. We argue that house-money and disposition effects might remain in 
relative terms. 
 
Country Treatment # Students % Men Avg. Age Avg. Bet
F 24 50.0% 24.08 40.10
Brazil I 28 57.1% 25.64 55.38
C 33 75.8% 21.36 44.45
F 32 56.3% 21.59 54.42
Spain I 32 37.5% 22.09 66.02
C 33 54.5% 21.82 47.24
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average investment of 40.10, while the I treatment had 55.38. The results for the 
Spanish subjects follow the same tendency, with the F group having 54.42, and the I 
treatment 66.02. In both samples, the predictions of MLA were verified and our results 
were close to the ones found by Haigh and List (2005): 50.89 (group F) and 62.5 (group 
I).  
Figure 2 Average Bets 
Average bets given by the percentage invested over the total amount available, grouped by country 
(Brazil and Spain) and treatment (F – frequent feedback; I – infrequent feedback; C – cumulative results).  
 
0,00
10,00
20,00
30,00
40,00
50,00
60,00
70,00
F I C
Brazil Spain
 
 To determine the significance of the differences, we used the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney test32. Table 4 presents the results segregated by groups of three rounds.  
The Table can be read as follows: row 1, column 1, at the intersection of “Rounds 1-3” 
and “Treatment F”, denotes that the average student in Treatment F bet 45.9 (with a 
standard deviation of 30.9) units in rounds 1-3. As a comparison, column 2 in the same 
                                                 
32 We cannot use the parametric t-test. Given the fact that subjects are confronted with an upper and lower 
bound for investing, the distribution must be non-normal. Moreover, results from the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test confirm the non-normality of data. 
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row indicates that the average student in Treatment I bets 55.7 (standard deviation of 
28.1) in the same rounds.  
Considering the whole sample, the average investment of group F was 48.3 and 
that of group I was 61.1, with a Mann-Whitney statistic of -7.49 (p-value of 0.000), 
indicating that these averages are statistically different. When we consider the time 
evolution of the bets, we observe the same pattern, with group F investing consistently 
less than group I. Also, subjects in Treatment I are investing more in latter rounds than 
in the first ones, indicating some learning effect. When we compare Treatments F and 
C, the previous difference disappears. The average student in Treatment C invested 46.8 
(standard deviation of 30.9) over all rounds, and the Mann-Whitney statistic when 
compared to the F group equals to 0.71 (p-value of 0.480), hence indicating no 
statistical difference. Another interesting observation from Table 4 is that subjects tend 
to bet more in latter rounds and this pattern remains among all treatments. Our intuition 
is that there is some learning effect and as the rounds are played, subjects realize the 
positive expected value of the lottery and are motivated to invest more. 
Table 4 - Treatments F, I and C 
Note: Columns 1-3 summarize student’s betting behavior over rounds. Standard deviations are provided 
in parentheses and p-values in brackets. Columns 4-5 summarize Mann-Whitney tests of the differences 
in behavior across treatment type. 
 
 In order to investigate age and gender effects, we grouped the results 
accordingly, reaching the numbers presented in Tables 5 and 6. The results are not clear, 
Rounds 1-3 45.9 (30.9) 55.7 (28.1) 42.8 (27.5) -3.59 [0.000] 0.64 [0.520]
Rounds 4-6 45.3 (34.6) 58.1 (28.4) 41.9 (29.9) -3.96 [0.000] 0.48 [0.634]
Rounds 7-9 46.8 (35.5) 62.6 (30.1) 48.2 (30.4) -4.33 [0.000] -0.91 [0.362]
Rounds 10-12 55.2 (36.6) 67.8 (29.8) 50.5 (34.6) -3.15 [0.002] 1.18 [0.237]
Rounds 1-12 48.3 (34.6) 61.1 (29.4) 45.8 (30.9) -7.49 [0.000] 0.71 [0.480]
Treatment F Treatment I Treatment C Mann-Whitney z
F vs. I F vs. C
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with some gender effect appearing in the groups I and C, and age effect being 
significant in group F. Despite the previous results on gender and age were not very 
robust, they go in line with the cultural behavioral prediction that a man and young 
subject is more individualist and so less risk averse. Johnson et al. (2006), experiment 
results show that age increases loss aversion. 
 
Table 5 - Treatments grouped by gender 
Columns 1-2 summarize student’s betting behavior over treatments, grouped by gender. Standard 
deviations are provided in parentheses and p-values in brackets. Column 3 summarizes Mann-Whitney 
tests of the differences in behavior across age groups. 
Rounds 1-12
Treatment F 46.6 (32.0) 49.8 (36.7) -0.57 [0.570]
Treatment I 59.4 (25.9) 62.9 (32.9) -2.52 [0.012]
Treatment C 41.7 (26.2) 48.1 (32.9) -2.33 [0.020]
Women Men Mann-Whitney z
 
Table 6 - Treatments F and I grouped by age 
Columns 1-2 summarize student’s betting behavior over treatments, grouped by gender. Standard 
deviations are provided in parentheses and p-values in brackets. Column 3 summarizes Mann-Whitney 
tests of the differences in behavior across age groups. 
 
 Table 7 presents the investment results of Treatments F, C and I, grouped by 
country. We can observe a significant country effect in Treatments F and I with subjects 
in Spain being consistently less risk averse, while group C didn’t present a statistically 
Rounds 1-12
Treatment F 50.6 (35.0) 40.7 (32.1) -2.98 [0.003]
Treatment I 62.8 (28.9) 59.0 (32.9) -1.24 [0.216]
Treatment C 46.0 (31.1) 46.3 (30.9) 0.10 [0.923]
Age > 23 Mann-Whitney zAge <= 23
Chapter Three: House-Money and Disposition Effect Overseas 
 70
significant difference33. This result goes in line with our predictions based on the fact 
that Spanish students are wealthier and slightly more individualists. Observe that all 
subjects were undergraduate students and so sharing approximately the same 
educational level, which could be influencing our results. That’s why the differences in 
the risk appetite of Spanish and Brazilian students are probably due to economic factors 
and not to the educational level. Also, Spanish students were slightly younger than the 
Brazilian subjects which can help explaining the results. 
Table 7 - Treatments F and I grouped by country 
Columns 1-2 summarize student’s betting behavior over treatments, grouped by country. Standard 
deviations are provided in parentheses and p-values in brackets. Column 3 summarizes Mann-Whitney 
tests of the differences in behavior across country groups. 
 
 
 
 To infer the house-money effect against loss aversion, Table 8 presents the 
average investment decision in each group, considering the decision taken after a loss 
and after a gain. Contradicting the predictions of the house-money effect, subjects 
invested more after a loss and less after a gain, supporting loss aversion, in Treatment 
C. However house-money prevails in Treatment I. So it seems that if we don’t make the 
                                                 
33 We believe that these results could in part be due to a wealth effect. One unit in the experiment 
represented 1 Euro cent for students in Spain and 1 Brazilian Real cent for students in Brazil. Since 1 
EUR = 2.2 BRL, European students received 2.2 as much as students in Brazil. However in terms of 
purchase power parity, this difference is much less. (1 BigMac = 4.50 BRL in Brazil = 3.50 EUR in 
Spain) 
 
 
Rounds 1-12
Treatment F 48.7 (36.1) 54.4 (35.0) 2.56 [0.011]
Treatment I 58.1 (28.5) 66.0 (29.9) 3.97 [0.000]
Treatment C 45.5 (31.0) 46.5 (29.3) 0.49 [0.625]
Brazil Spain Mann-Whitney z
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subject feel the monetary consequences of his previous decision affecting his available 
income for his future choices (as we did in Treatment C), the results are not clear.  
An interesting result is that when we asked the subjects about their risk 
preferences, in line with Thaler and Johnson (1990), we found that 79% of the students 
would increase their bets after a gain and just 37% would invest after a loss; thereby 
supporting the house-money effect. We conclude from these findings that the prospect 
of a loss (gain) is different from the experience of a loss (gain), and in a dynamic 
environment, the outcome effect dominates the individual’s previous cognitive 
evaluation. Previous papers (Haigh and List, 2005; Bellamare et al, 2005; Gneezy and 
Potters, 1997) didn’t find conclusive results about this dynamic risk aversion behavior.  
Table 8 - Treatments F and I grouped previous gain or loss 
Columns 1-2 summarize student’s betting behavior over treatments, grouped by previous result. Standard 
deviations are provided in parentheses and p-values in brackets. Column 3 summarizes Mann-Whitney 
tests of the differences in behavior across previous result groups. 
Rounds 1-12
Treatment F 50.1 (32.3) 49.5 (35.4) 0.61 [0.520]
Treatment I 61.2 (29.7) 59.1 (32.7) 1.27 [0.181]
Treatment C 53.1 (31.5) 43.5 (31.5) 5.09 [0.000]
After Loss After Gain Mann-Whitney z
 
 Although the previous analysis already gives some support to hypothesis 2a, and 
rejects hypothesis 2b, we can implement a complementary statistical inference. As in 
Haigh and List (2005), to provide a test for robustness, we estimate a regression model, 
in which we regressed34 the individual bet on a dummy variable for the country, a 
dummy variable for the treatment and on the interaction between the two. The results 
are presented in Table 9, in which we can observe a significant country effect. 
                                                 
34 We estimated a Tobit regression (censored regression model) as the dependent variable (individual bet) 
is non-negative. 
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Considering students from groups F and I, the average student from Spain 
invests 10.40 more than a Brazilian student. The treatment effect is also significant 
among groups F and I, indicating that students from Treatment F, on average, invest 
16.87 less than the students from group I, again supporting the MLA predictions. When 
we consider the students from Treatments F and C, the country effect is still significant 
but no treatment effect remains.  
Table 9 - Regression Results 
Tobit regression, p-values are provided in brackets. The dependent variable is the individual bet. “Brazil” 
is the omitted subject category, and therefore represents the baseline group. Country S (Treatment F) is 
the country (treatment) indicator variable that equals 1 if the subject was a Spanish student (in Treatment 
F), 0 otherwise. Country S*Treatment F is the country indicator variable interacted with the frequent 
feedback treatment variable. P-values of each regression coefficient are in brackets. The F-statistic, R2 
and the number of observations, N, are also provided. 
Variable
Constant 55.13 [0.000] 42.80 [0.000]
Country S 10.40 [0.000] 4.94 [0.050]
Treatment F -16.87 [0.000] -3.68 [0.182]
Country S*Treatment F 4.36 [0.227] 9.83 [0.009]
F stat
R2
N 1464
7.34% 2.08%
Specification
F and I F and C
36.66 10.35
1392
 
 Finally, to investigate the house-money effect, we regressed students’ bets on a 
dummy variable indicating if the student had a prior gain or loss, a dummy for the 
treatment and their interaction. Table 10 provides the results. When we consider 
students from groups F and I, no significant win/lose effect is found, which is in 
agreement with previous results found in the literature that use an experimental design 
close to ours. The treatment effect is significant among groups F and I, indicating that 
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students from Treatment F, on average, invest 9.88 less than the students from group I, 
again supporting the MLA predictions. 
 If we investigate groups F and C, the fact of having a prior gain induces a 
significant reduction in the amount invested by 9.68, gives support to our hypothesis 2a, 
and rejects the house-money effect. It also indicates that our experimental design 
(Treatment C) could elucidate the contradiction between house-money and loss aversion 
in dynamic settings.  
 
Table 10 - Regression Results 
Tobit regression, p-values are provided in brackets. The dependent variable is the individual bet. 
“Previous Loss” is the omitted subject category, and therefore represents the baseline group. Prior Gain 
(Treatment F) is the win (treatment) indicator variable that equals 1 if the subject won in the previous 
round (in Treatment F), 0 otherwise. Prior Gain*Treatment F is the win indicator variable interacted with 
the frequent feedback treatment variable. P-values of each regression coefficient are in brackets. The F-
statistic, R2 and the number of observations N are also provided. 
Variable
Constant 60.852 [0.000] 52.084 [0.000]
Prior Gain 0.91 [0.747] -9.68 [0.011]
Treatment F -9.88 [0.000] -1.17 [0.619]
Prior Gain*Treatment F -1.33 [0.456] 8.19 [0.048]
F stat
R2
N
Specification
F and I F and C
15.25 28.47
1276 1342
2.68% 5.58%
 
Observe that the coefficient for Treatment F in the specification F and C was 
negative (-1.17) but not significant and the coefficient for the compounding effect of 
Prior Gain*Treatment F was even positive and significant which would lead to an 
opposite result. With Treatment C we could distinguish the effect of previous risk 
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decisions and outcomes over future decisions and in these cases loss aversion dominates 
house-money.  
 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
 In the behavior finance literature, experiments were used to identify or give 
support to the existence of behavioral biases, which could clarify market anomalies. 
Nevertheless, those experiments were mainly made in unique locations: the USA or 
Europe. Moreover, two of these behavioral effects - house-money and loss aversion - 
lead to controversial results when we analyze the risk taking behavior of agents in a 
dynamic setting.  
Our results support the existence of MLA over the countries but a country effect 
is also found, indicating that care should be taken when generalizing behavioral findings 
over the international financial market. A slightly salient gender and age effect was 
found in the sample. Young and male subjects presented a lower level of risk aversion. 
Finally, and most importantly, disposition effect is found to dominate the risk-
taking behavior of subjects in dynamic settings, overcoming the house-money effect. 
Subjects that experienced a gain (loss) tend to assume less (more) risk in the following 
period. As possible extensions we suggest to go further in the investigation of which 
country characteristics are generating the effect found in this study, and also the use of 
other countries’ students replicating the experimental design C, since we have found 
that there seems to be a country effect as well, which could be due to cultural 
differences.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Behavior Finance and Estimation Risk in Stochastic Portfolio 
Optimization 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
 
In a standard asset allocation process, once the risk tolerance, constraints, and 
financial goals are set, the output is given by a mean-variance optimization (Markowitz, 
1952; Feldman and Reisman, 2002). Unfortunately this procedure is likely to fail for 
individuals, who are susceptible to behavioral biases. For instance, in response to short-
term market movements and to the detriment of the long-term investment plan, the 
individual investor may require his asset allocation to be changed. Fernandes et al. 
(2007) suggest that early liquidation of a long term investment may be the cause of 
momentum.  
Moreover, the paradigm of individual behavior in finance theory is based on 
expected utility maximization and risk aversion, which has been under attack in recent 
years due to its descriptive inaccuracy. Experimental psychologists have demonstrated 
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that people systematically deviate from the choice predictions it implies as they are 
typically biased.  
Behavioral biases can roughly be grouped in two categories: cognitive and 
emotional, though both types yield irrational decisions. Because cognitive biases 
(heuristics like anchoring, availability, and representative biases) stem from faulty 
reasoning, better information and advice can often correct them. Conversely, emotional 
biases, such as regret and loss aversion, originate from impulsive feelings or intuition, 
rather than conscious reasoning, and are hardly possible to correct. Lo et al. (2005) 
investigated several possible links between psychological factors and trading 
performance, finding that subjects whose emotional reaction to monetary gains and 
losses was more intense on both the positive and negative side exhibited significantly 
worse trading performance.  
Shefrin (2005) posits that the portfolios selected by investors whose choices 
conform to prospect theory will differ in key aspects from the portfolios selected by 
investors whose choices conform to expected utility theory. In this sense, an optimal 
solution to the asset allocation problem should guide investors to make decisions that 
serve their best interest. This could be the recommendation of an asset allocation that 
suits the investor’s natural psychological preferences (emotional biases), even though it 
may not maximize expected return for a given level of risk. More simply, a client’s best 
practical allocation may be a slightly under-performing long-term investment program 
to which the investor can comfortably adhere. From a mean-variance optimization 
perspective, behavioral investors select portfolios that are stochastically dominated. 
This does not mean that the individual investors are irrational in any sense: it is not 
irrational for people to anticipate emotional reactions and take them into account when 
making decisions that try to synchronize their choices to their preferences. However, 
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portfolio managers lack the guidelines necessary for incorporating these biases during 
the process of determining asset allocation. We address this issue by evaluating whether 
managers should moderate the way clients naturally behave to counteract the effects of 
behavioral biases so that they can fit a pre-determined asset allocation or they should 
create an asset allocation that adapt to clients’ biases, so that clients can comfortable 
adhere to the fund.  
In terms of emotional biases, several empirical studies (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992) have shown that, when dealing with gains, agents are risk averse, but when 
choices involve losses, agents are risk seeking (asymmetric risk taking behavior). 
Moreover, in a wide variety of domains, people are significantly more averse to losses 
than they are attracted to same-sized gains (Rabin, 1998). Loss aversion (Schmidt and 
Zank, 2005) is a relevant psychological concept that has been imported to financial and 
economic analysis, and it represents the foundation of prospect theory. 
In general terms, prospect theory and its latter version cumulative prospect 
theory35 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1992) posits four novel concepts in the 
framework of individuals’ risk preferences. First, investors evaluate assets according to 
gains and losses and not according to final wealth (mental accounting). Second, 
individuals are more averse to losses than they are attracted to gains (loss aversion). 
Third, individuals are risk-seeking in the domain of losses and risk averse in the domain 
of gains (asymmetric risk preference). Finally, individuals evaluate extreme 
probabilities in a way that overestimates low probabilities and underestimates high 
probabilities (probability weighting function). This study, as far as we know, is the first 
to consider all those aspects in the framework of portfolio choice. 
                                                 
35 Tversky and Kahneman’s Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) (1992) combines the concepts of loss 
aversion and a non linear rank dependent weighting of probability assessments. 
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There are conflicting results in the finance literature on how prior outcomes 
affect the risk taking behavior of investors in subsequent periods. Loss aversion would 
predict that traders with profitable mornings would reduce their exposure to afternoon 
risk, trying to avoid losses and thus guaranteeing the previous gains (Weber and Zuchel, 
2003). Odean (1998) and Weber and Camerer (1998) have shown that investors are 
more willing to sell stocks that trade above the purchase price (winners) than stocks that 
trade below purchase price (losers) – a phenomenon termed the disposition effect 
(Schefrin and Statman, 1985). Both works interpreted this behavior as evidence of 
decreased risk aversion after a loss, and increased risk aversion after a gain. The 
standard explanation for the previous behavior is based on prospect theory, and 
particularly on the fact that individuals are risk-seeking in the domain of losses and risk 
averse in the domain of gains (asymmetric risk preference).  
However, another stream of the literature found the opposite behavior. Thaler 
and Johnson (1990) name the house-money effect, the behavior of increasing risk 
appetite after a gain. Barberis et al. (2001) present a model where investors are less loss 
averse after a gain while they become more loss averse after prior losses. 
Despite the vast literature confirming the behavioral biases associated with 
prospect theory, the consideration of all those biases in an asset allocation framework is 
still missing. Barberis and Huang (2001) and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) use 
loss aversion and mental accounting (Thaler, 1999) to explain aspects of stock price 
behavior, but do not employ the full prospect theory framework and don’t examine 
optimal asset allocation. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) consider prospect theory to solve 
the equity premium puzzle when investors are loss averse and evaluate their portfolios 
myopically with a horizon of approximately one year. They also suggest an optimal 
allocation in equities from 30% to 55%. Magi (2005) uses behavioral preferences to 
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numerically solve a simple model of international portfolio choice, providing a possible 
explanation for the equity home bias puzzle. 
Davies and Satchell (2004) provide a solution for the optimal equity allocation, 
and explore more thoroughly the cumulative prospect theory parameter space that is 
consistent with observed equity allocations given a financial market’s returns 
distributions over a one-month horizon. Shefrin (2005) considers heterogeneous 
investors to see the impact of behavioral concepts in the framework of asset pricing.  
The first main goal of this study is to incorporate mental accounting, loss 
aversion, asymmetric risk taking, disposition effect, and probability weighting in 
portfolio optimization in a multi-period setting for individual investors. We provide a 
solution for the asset allocation problem, taking into account all behavioral biases 
associated with prospect theory and using a utility function (suggested in Giorgi et. al., 
2004) consistent with both the experimental results of Tversky and Kahneman, and also 
with the existence of equilibrium. We also shed more light on the issue of how prior 
outcomes affect subsequent risk taking behavior, investigating the investor’s risk taking 
behavior following a rise, or a fall, in the price of the risky asset. 
In line with prospect theory, investors derive utility from fluctuations in the 
value of their final wealth. In our framework, there is a financial market on which two 
assets are traded. A riskless asset, also called a bond, and a risky asset, also called a 
stock (under the assumption of normally distributed returns for the risky asset). As we 
are modeling the decision making process of an individual investor, short-selling is not 
allowed. In each period (we consider two periods), the investor chooses the weight of 
his endowment to be invested in the risky asset, in order to maximize his utility 
(prospect theory based). We assume that the investor acts myopically, and that the 
reference point relative to which he measures his gains and losses for the first period is 
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his initial endowment. Although all agents solve the same maximization problem in the 
first period, the second period decision depends on the reference point relative to which 
the agent measures the second period outcomes (gains or losses). We consider two 
possible reference points: the initial wealth or the current wealth, and analyze both 
cases. St-Amour (2006) results reveal that references are strongly relevant and state-
dependent. 
 Another well-known issue in asset allocation problems, using Markowitz 
optimization, is that the output is strongly driven by the risk/return estimation, which 
usually generates very unstable portfolios. The most famous problem with this 
technique is the substitution problem, where two assets with the same risk but slightly 
different expected returns. The optimizer would give all the weight to the asset with the 
higher expected return, leading to a very unstable asset allocation.  
 Recent literature has tried to overcome the previous problem of leading to 
unfeasible portfolios. The main focus of those models is to find out how to create 
realistic portfolios considering that the values used for risk and return are not 
deterministic but instead just estimates (they are stochastic). It should be noted that the 
misspecification of expected returns is much more critical than that of variances 
(Zimmer and Niederhauser, 2003).  
 Jorion (1986) offers a simple empirical Bayes estimator that should outperform 
the sample mean in the context of a portfolio. His main idea is to select an estimator 
with average minimizing properties relative to the loss function (the loss due to 
estimation risk). Instead of the sample mean, an estimator obtained by “shrinking” the 
means toward a common value is proposed (the average return for the minimum 
variance portfolio), which should lead to decreased estimation error. Similar to Jorion, 
Kempf (2002) assumes that the prior mean is identical across all risky assets. However, 
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Kempf’s model considers estimation risk as a second source of risk, determined by the 
heterogeneity of the market and given by the standard deviation of the expected returns 
across risky assets. 
 Black and Litterman (1992) postulate that the consideration of the global CAPM 
equilibrium can significantly improve the usefulness of asset allocation models, as it can 
provide a neutral starting point for estimating the set of expected excess returns required 
to drive the portfolio optimization process. Horst et al. (2002) propose a new adjustment 
in mean-variance portfolio weights to incorporate the estimation risk. The adjustment 
amounts to using a pseudo risk-aversion, rather than the actual risk aversion, which 
depends on the sample size, the number of assets in the portfolio, and the curvature of 
the mean-variance frontier. The pseudo risk aversion is always higher than the actual 
one and this difference increases with the uncertainty in the expected return estimations. 
Maenhout (2004) also considers an adjustment in the coefficient of risk aversion to 
insure the investor against some endogenous worst case.  
Finally, Michaud (1998) suggests portfolio sampling as a way to allow an 
analyst to visualize the estimation error in traditional portfolio optimization methods, 
and Sherer (2002) posits that sampling from a multivariate normal distribution (a 
parametric method termed Monte Carlo simulation) is a way to capture the estimation 
error. Markowitz and Usmen, 2003, compared the traditional approach to resampling 
and their results support the latter. Fernandes et al. (2007) evaluates several asset 
allocation models and suggests that resampling methods typically offer the best results. 
This study presents a novel approach (BRATE – Behavioral Resampling 
Adjusted Technique) to incorporate behavioral biases and estimation risk into mean-
variance portfolio selection. In a paper close to ours, Vlcek (2006) proposes a model to 
evaluate portfolio choice with loss aversion, asymmetric risk-taking behavior, and 
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segregation of risk less opportunities. His findings suggest that the changes in portfolio 
weights crucially depend on the reference point and the ratio between the reference 
point and the current wealth, and thus indirectly on the performance of the risky asset. 
Our work differs from his study as we explicitly consider all novel aspects of prospect 
theory: mental accounting, loss aversion, asymmetric risk-taking behavior, and 
probability weighting function. We also evaluate the inefficiency cost of the behavioral 
biases and consider a more general form for the risky asset return process, including 
estimation risk in the analysis.  
Considering daily equity data from the period from 1995 to 2007, we empirically 
evaluate our model in comparison to the traditional Markowitz model. Our results 
support the use of BRATE as an alternative for defining optimal asset allocation and 
posit that a portfolio optimization model may be adapted to the individual biases 
implied in prospect theory. 
The remainder of this Chapter contains the following sections. Section 2 
discusses the behavioral biases considered and describes our model proposing the 
behavioral resampling adjusted technique (BRATE). Section 3 presents the empirical 
study, describing the data and implementation, and providing the results. Section 4 
concludes the chapter by reviewing the main achievements. 
 
4.2.  The Behavioral Model 
 
 We present a two period’s model for portfolio choice in a stylized financial 
market with only two assets, where the investor’s preferences are described by 
cumulative prospect theory as suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992). In our framework, there is a financial market in which two assets 
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are traded. A riskless asset, also called the bond, and a risky asset, the stock. Let us 
consider the return of the stock in each period given by the following process: 
nR σμ += , with )1,0(~ Nn . The risk free bond yields a sure return of fR . We assume 
that the time value of the money is positive, i.e. that interest rates are non-negative.  
 The preferences of the investor are based on changes in wealth and are described 
by prospect theory. We assume that he owns an initial endowment, 0W  (normalized to 1 
monetary unit), and that he earns no other income. The agent invests a proportion θ  of 
his wealth in the stock and (1 - θ ) in the bond. Since we want to model the individual 
investor behavior, we assume that short selling is not allowed ( 10 ≤≤ θ ). We also 
assume that the investor acts myopically, and the reference point relative to which he 
measures his gains and losses in the first period is his initial wealth. Then, the perceived 
gain or loss in the end of the first period is given by: 
( )[ ]
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 As pointed out in Vlcek (2006) the choice process under prospect theory starts 
with the editing phase, followed by the evaluation of edited prospects, and finally the 
alternative with the highest value is chosen. During the editing phase, agents 
discriminate gains and losses. They also perform additional mental adjustments in the 
original probability function )(xfp = , defining the probability weighting function 
)( pπ . Based on experimental evidence, individuals adjust the likelihood of outcomes 
such that small probabilities are overweighted and large probabilities are 
underweighted. We will consider the probability weighting function, as in Giorgi et al. 
(2004) given by:  
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where γ is the adjustment factor. The following graph compares the values of p and 
)( pπ , considering γ =0.8036. 
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Figure 1 – Cumulative probability weighting function for γ =0.80. 
 In the valuing phase, the agents attach a subjective value to the gamble. Let us 
assume the value function proposed by Giorgi et al. (2004), as follows: 
⎩⎨
⎧
<−
≥−= −−
−++
0    if    ,
0    if    ,
)(
xe
xe
xv x
x
λλ
λλ
α
α
        (Eq. 03) 
where α is the coefficient of absolute risk preference, 0>> +− λλ  makes the value 
function steeper in the negative side (loss aversion), and x is the change in wealth or 
welfare, rather than final states (mental accounting), as proposed by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). Also, the value function is concave above the reference point and 
convex below it (asymmetric risk preference). It is useful to consider the previous 
                                                 
36 Experiments suggest a value of γ between 0.80 and 0.90. 
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form for the value function because of the existence of a CAPM equilibrium37 and 
the ability to reach constant coefficients of risk preference (α ). The previous 
formulation is also supported by the laboratory results from Bosh-Domènech and 
Silvestre (2003). The following graph indicates )(xv when α  = 0.88, −λ = 2.25 and 
+λ = 1 ( Kahneman and Tversky suggested values).  
-1,5
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
1
-1,5 -1 -0,5 0 0,5 1 1,5
 
Figure 2 – Prospect theory value function for  α  = 0.88, −λ = 2.25 and +λ = 1 
 In our two-period model for portfolio choice, the investor chooses a weight in 
the risky asset to maximize his expected utility (V). His preferences are based on 
changes in his wealth ( x ) and are described by prospect theory. The total expected 
value he addresses to a given choice of θ  is given by: 
∫∞
∞−
= dxxf
dx
dxvV ))(()( π        (Eq. 04) 
                                                 
37 Under Cumulated Prospect Theory (CPT) with Tversky and Kahneman (1992) specifications, equilibria 
do not exist as at least one investor can infinitely increase his utility by infinitely leveraging the market 
portfolio (the utility index is almost linear for large stakes), while the Security Market Line Theorem 
holds (Giorgi et al. , 2004). 
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where )(xv  is the prospect value of the outcome x , and ))(( xfπ  is the weighted 
cumulative probability associated with that outcome. Prospect theory is a descriptive 
theory, postulating that, in comparing alternatives, the investor will choose the 
alternative that makes V as high as possible. Let us then evaluate the investor’s problem 
in each period. 
4.2.1 First Period 
 In the first period, the agent’s problem consists of defining the allocation of his 
initial wealth between the two assets traded in the financial market. He maximizes his 
utility in t = 0 by allocating a fraction, 0θ , of his initial wealth38, 0W , in the risky asset 
and (1 - 0θ ) in the riskfree asset. We consider that the investor is a myopic optimizer in 
the sense that he takes into account only the first period result. For multi-period 
horizons, the choices at earlier dates impact the reference points at later dates. This 
feature allows for complex modeling. However, as pointed out in Shefrin (2005), 
prospect theory is a theory about investors who oversimplify, and so, assuming that 
individuals are sophisticated enough to perceive the link between their current choices 
and future reference points is something unreasonable. We also constrain short selling, 
as it is common for individual investors’ models. Thus, his problem can be given by 
∫∞
∞−≤≤
= dxxf
dx
dxvV ))(()(max
10
πθ        (Eq. 05) 
 Let us make the following derivation: ( ) )(1 00 nRx f σμθθ ++−= . Rearranging 
the terms in x , we get ( ) nRx f σθμθθ 0001 ++−= . We call ( ) μθθ 001 +− fR  = B and 
C=σθ0 . Then, CnBx += , and so x > 0 implies C
Bn −> . Then, 
                                                 
38 We will consider the investor’s initial wealth equals to 1. 
Chapter Four: Behavior Finance and Estimation Risk in Portfolio Optimization 
 
 87
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) 06)  (Eq.     )()()(
))(()()(
))(())(()()(ˆ1
))(())((
))(())((
))(()(
22
2
1
)()(
0
0
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−+−+−=∴
−+−+−=∴
−+−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−=∴
−++−=∴
−++−=∴
=
−+−−++
∞
−
−−+
∞
−−−++
∞
−
−−+
−
∞−
−−+
−
∞−
−+−
∞
−
++−+
∞−
−−
∞
+−+
∞
∞−
∫∫
∫∫
∫∫
∫∫
∫
C
C
BeC
C
Bee
C
BV
nfdeenfdee
C
BV
nfdeenfdee
C
B
C
BV
nfdenfdeV
xfdexfdeV
dxxf
dx
dxvV
BBC
C
B
nCB
C
B
nCB
C
B
nCB
C
B
nCB
C
B
CnB
C
B
CnB
xx
απλαπλπλλλ
πλπλπλλλ
πλπλπλπλ
πλλπλλ
πλλπλλ
π
ααα
αααα
αααα
αα
αα
 
Where, for the last step, we used39: 
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Observe that, if we were considering a standard utility function (risk aversion 
over all possible outcomes), the value would be given by: 
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 Moreover, the partial derivatives of V (Eq. 06) are: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
( )[ ]
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 09) (Eq.  }1)]1(
)
1
([{
08) (Eq.       ]}
1
ˆ
1
[{
0
0
00
0
0
00)1(
0
0
00)(2
1
0
2
00
0
001
0
0
001)(2
1
00
2
0
2
00
00
2
0
2
θσθ
μθθπλλασαθσθ
μθθπλ
σαθσθ
μθθπλσθασ
θσαθσθ
μθθπλ
σαθσθ
μθθπλαμ
μθθα
ασθα
μθθα
μθθασθα
⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−−−+−
−−+−−=∂
∂
⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−−=∂
∂
+−+−−+
−
+−−+
+−−
ffR
fB
fR
fR
RR
e
R
eeV
R
e
R
eeV
f
f
f
 
                                                 
39 It’s valid for γ=1. 
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As a consequence, the following properties hold40, 
i) 0>∂
∂
μ
V ; 
ii) 0=∂
∂
σ
V  for 0=σ or ∞=σ ; 
iii) 0<∂
∂
σ
V  for 0>σ . 
 Equations 06 and 07 clearly yield different weights for the risky asset, 
considering the remaining parameters fixed. Thus, it is possible to evaluate the cost of 
inefficiency associated with the behavioral biases as compared to the standard utility 
solution.  
( )[ ] ( )[ ] 10) (Eq.     11 0000 RRRRCost PTfPTSfS θθθθ +−−+−=  
where S0θ  is the risky asset weight given by the standard utility maximization problem, 
and PT0θ is the stock weight as defined in our model. 
 
Proposition 1. The optimal asset allocation in t = 0, for the risky asset *0θ  is such that 
maximizes the value function given by: 
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where: ( )[ ]μθθ *0*01 +−= fRB  and σθ *0=C . 
 
 If we were considering a standard utility function, the optimal allocation in t = 0, 
for the risky asset would then be given by: 
2
*
0 ασ
μθ fR−=  
                                                 
40 See Appendix B for the proofs. 
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 Let us first consider standard values for the model’s parameters41. The risk free 
rate equals the historical annual return of the US three-month Treasury Bill ( fR = 
2.73%). The equity expected return and volatility equals the historical average of the 
MSCI global equity index and its standard deviation (μ = 7.61% and σ = 12.98%). The 
adjustment factor in the probability weighting function equals γ = 0.90. The coefficient 
of risk aversion equals α = 3. Also, as suggested by Kahneman and Tversky, −λ = 2.25 
and +λ = 1. The individual’s values (prospect theory and standard) as a function of the 
percentage of his wealth invested in the risky asset are given in Figure 3. The individual 
investor is expected to choose the allocation in the risky asset which maximizes his 
expected value. 
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Figure 3 – Prospect value and standard utility value as function of θ  
                                                 
41 The riskfree rate, the expected return of the risky asset and the volatility of the risky asset were 
calculated, using daily data, over the period from 1995 and 2007. The results were annualized. 
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 As can be observed from the graph, using a standard utility function, the 
allocation in the risky asset approaches 100% (theta for which the value function 
reaches its maximum), while using prospect theory utility, the investor should allocate 
81% of his wealth in the stock42. The shapes of the graphs are different, notably for 
large allocations in the stock. The value function using standard utility is equal to or 
greater than the one for prospect utility.  
The reason for this difference comes from the fact that in prospect theory, 
negative outcomes are penalized more (as are risky portfolios) because individuals are 
loss averse ( −λ > +λ ). In the loss aversion literature evidence suggests that individuals 
are around twice more sensitive to losses than they are attracted to same size gains. For 
small allocations in stocks, the prospect of losses becomes less likely and the value 
functions tend to coincide. 
Related to the effect of probability weighting, if we set γ  = 1, thus canceling out 
its effect, we reach the following Figure representing the value function: 
                                                 
42 Davies and Satchell (2004) found that the average proportion in domestic and foreign equities of large 
pension funds in 1993 was 83% in the UK, which is in line with the prospect theory results. 
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Figure 4 – Prospect value and standard utility value as function of θ  
 Note that the amount optimally invested by the behavioral investor in the risky 
asset decreases to 48%, and so probability weighting tends to increase the risk appetite. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that the overweighting of low probabilities has 
an ambiguous effect on risk taking, as it can induce risk aversion in the domain of 
losses, and risk seeking in the domain of gains. In our case, the overestimation of the 
extreme positive outcomes probabilities, shown in Figure 3, is inducing investors to 
take more risk.  
However, despite the effects of loss aversion and probability weighting, even if 
we consider −λ = +λ = 1 and γ  = 1, keeping constant the remaining parameters, the 
value functions wouldn’t coincide, as can be seen in Figure 5: 
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Figure 5 – Prospect value and standard utility value as function of θ  
 Both models would predict that the investor should allocate 100% of his 
endowments in the stock. However, the value functions are different because, in 
prospect theory, individuals are risk seeking in the loss domain (asymmetric risk 
preference). Thus, they would be more comfortable in allocating a greater part of their 
wealth in the risky asset. The prospect value function is greater than the standard utility 
function.  
Observe that the effect of the asymmetric risk preference goes in the opposite 
direction of loss aversion and probability weighting. When we diminish the coefficient 
of risk preference (α = 0.25) in both utility functions, we reduce the effect of 
asymmetry, and so the value functions are much closer, as can be seen in the following 
figure.  
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Figure 6 – Prospect value and standard utility value as function of θ    
 The effects of the behavioral biases can thus be summarized as follows: loss 
aversion reduces risk taking, and asymmetric risk taking behavior induces risky 
attitudes. Probability weighting has an ambiguous effect on risk. Our intuition is that, in 
the long run, as the value function parameters are changing, these biases tend to cancel 
out, eliminating the efficiency loss originated by each bias. That is why we argue that 
human biases do not need to be moderated to reach an efficient investment strategy. The 
experimental results of Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006) reveal that the effect of loss 
aversion is largely neutralized by the overweighting of small probabilities and 
underweighting of moderate and high probabilities. 
 In order to verify property (i), Let us evaluate V while changing μ  and keeping 
constant the other parameters (considering θ  = 50%). Figure 7 presents the graph which 
indicates that over all positive values of μ , the slope of V is positive. The value 
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function is increasing in μ . Thus, when the risky asset has a higher expected return, 
ceteris paribus implies a higher value for the investor. 
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
V
( μ)
μ
 
Figure 7 – Prospect value as function of μ    
 Considering properties (ii) and (iii), Let us evaluate V while changing σ  and 
keeping constant the other parameters (considering θ  = 50%). Figure 8 presents the 
graph indicating that over all positive values of σ , the slope of V is negative, while for 
σ  = 0, the slope is null. When σ  tends to infinity, the slope tends to null. The value 
function is decreasing in σ .  
The intuition is that, if the volatility of the risky asset is higher, for the same 
allocation, this implies a higher probability of losses reducing the value of the prospect. 
In line with traditional rational investor, behavioral individuals also prefer higher return 
and lower risk; mainly because they are risk averse in the gain domain and also loss 
averse. 
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Figure 8 – Prospect value as function of σ    
 Now let us evaluate the values of 0θ  when we change the riskfree rate and the 
expected return of the risky asset. Since many parameters are involved, it is not possible 
to find closed form solutions for 0θ . Therefore, we present numerical results for the 
optimal allocation of wealth in t = 0. Figure 9 presents the results for %15%0 << μ  
and %60 << fR . The remaining parameters are fixed (σ = 12.98%, α = 3, −λ = 2.25, 
and +λ = 1).  
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Figure 9 – Optimal equity allocation in the first period as function of μ  and rf.   
As expected, when the risky asset offers more attractive returns, the agent 
gradually invests more in the stock. When the stock is very attractive, the investor 
chooses to allocate his entire wealth in the risky asset. Thus, we observe that 0θ  is 
increasing in μ  and decreasing in fR . Also, when fR  is higher, the changes in 0θ  due 
to a variation in μ  are smoother, because in these cases losses are less likely and we 
approach the standard utility solution. When fR  is lower, the changes in 0θ  due to a 
variation in μ  are more abrupt, giving rise to extreme portfolio allocations. If we 
consider that μ  is not known with certainty, the resulting portfolio would be very 
unstable. Gomes (2003), in a model with loss-averse investors, has found that 
individuals will not hold stocks unless the equity premium is quite high. 
 We can evaluate the expected cost of inefficiency related to the behavioral 
biases associated to the prospect theory function, for the same parameters considered in 
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the previous analysis, using equation 10. The result is presented in Figure 10, and its 
form is due to the fact that, in standard utility function, the investor is willing to take 
more risk than with the loss averse prospect utility. The cost is due to the fact that the 
expected return of the stock is greater than the bond, and the standard utility investor is 
allocating a greater part of his wealth in the risky asset than the prospect utility 
individual. Thus, the cost is increasing in μ . However, it is worth noting that the 
previous cost is based on expected returns, which are stochastic in practice. The real 
cost can just be observed at the end of the first period with the realization of the stock’s 
return.  
 An important insight can be made from Figure 10 in terms of the best practice 
for asset allocation. As long as the risk free rate is lower and the expected return of the 
stock is higher, the optimal allocation should moderate the investor’s biases in order to 
reach a better performance. On the other hand, if the risk premium is lower, the 
moderation is less relevant, and the optimal allocation may adapt to the individual’s 
biases.  
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Figure 10 – Expected cost  in the first period as function of μ  and rf.   
 We can also analyze the change in the allocation of the stock when we vary the 
loss aversion in the risk taking behavior. The result is shown in Figure 11, for 
42 << −λ . Observe that, as long as the investor is much more averse to losses than he 
is attracted to gains, the allocation in the risky asset is lower. When 25.2=−λ , the 
allocation in the risky asset corresponds to 81%, as previously mentioned.  
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Figure 11 –Optimal equity allocation in the first period as function of −λ . 
 Dimmock(2005) has already shown that a higher level of loss-aversion leads to 
lower equity exposure, and heterogeneity in the coefficient of loss aversion has the 
ability to explain puzzling features of household financial behavior. 
4.2.2 Second Period 
 In order to evaluate the second period allocation choice of the investor, Let us 
keep some parameters fixed: (σ = 12.98, α = 3, −λ = 2.25 and +λ = 1). After the 
investor has made his first period decision in t = 0, the state of nature realizes in t = 1, 
when he is faced with his second period problem. Again, he must allocate his wealth in 
the two possible assets in the financial market, bond and stock, to maximize his utility. 
Let us consider the same normal distribution for the return of the risky asset. The 
investor’s wealth position at t = 2 equals his position in t = 1 plus the return of his 
portfolio in the second period.  
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 While all agents solve the same maximization problem in the first period, in the 
second period, it will depend on the reference point to which he measures his gains and 
losses (in the framework of prospect theory). In our model, there are two candidates for 
the investor’s reference point at t = 1: his initial wealth at t = 0 ( 10 =W ) or his wealth at 
the end of the first period, t = 1 ( 1W ). If he measures his gains and losses relative to his 
wealth at t = 1 (his current wealth), he treats each gain and loss separately. On the other 
hand, if he considers his initial wealth as the reference point, he adds up the outcomes 
(gains and losses), that is, he nets his positions. The previous distinction is relevant in 
prospect theory. The value function is concave in the domain of gains and convex in the 
loss domain (asymmetric risk behavior).  
 First, Let us consider as the investor’s reference point his current wealth at t = 1. 
In this case, the maximization problem he will solve in the second period is the same as 
the one for the first period. Thus, we can state the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2. The optimal asset allocation in t = 1, for the risky asset *1θ , if the agent 
measures his gains and losses relative to his current wealth, is such that maximizes the 
same value function of the first period. *0
*
1 θθ =  
 
 We can observe that an individual who measures his gains and losses relative to 
his current wealth is actually solving the same maximization problem in each period. 
That is why the allocation in the risky asset might be the same. This is not surprising; as 
he is not using past information to update his beliefs about the assets, his preferences 
are similarly unaffected. 
 Next, let us analyze the investor’s maximization problem if he evaluates his 
gains and losses relative to his initial wealth.  If he has an initial wealth position of 0W  
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= 100 and his wealth rises in the first period to 1W  = 110 and falls in the next period to 
2W  = 105, he values his position at t = 2 as a gain of 5, and not as a gain of 10 followed 
by a loss of 5.  
 In the second period, the agent’s problem consists of defining the allocation of 
his wealth ( 1W ) between the two assets traded in the financial market. He maximizes his 
utility in t = 1 by allocating a fraction, 1θ , of his wealth 1W  in the risky asset and 1- 1θ  
in the risk-less asset. As we did in the first period analysis, we also constrain short 
selling.  
∫∞
∞−≤≤
= dxxf
dx
dxvV ))(()(max
10
πθ  
 Let us make the following derivation: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]1000111 1)(1 RRWnRWx ff θθσμθθ +−+++−=  
 and ( )[ ]10001 11 RRWW f θθ +−+= , where 1R  is the return of the stock in the first 
period.  So ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]100111000 1)(111 RRnRRRWx fff θθσμθθθθ +−+++−⋅+−+= . 
Rearranging the terms in x  and considering W0 = 1, we get  
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )[ ]
( )( )]1
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f
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Let us call 
( )( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )]1111[ 10011100 RRRRRB fff θθμθθθθ +−++−⋅+−+=  
and 
( )( )( )1001 11 RRC f θθσθ +−+=  
Then, CnBx += , so x > 0 implies 
C
Bn −> . Then, 
( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−−−+−+−= −+−−++ )()()(
22
2
1
C
C
BeC
C
Bee
C
BV BB
C απλαπλπλλλ ααα    (Eq. 11) 
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Proposition 3. The optimal asset allocation in t = 1, for the risky asset *1θ , if the agent 
measures his gains and losses relative to his initial wealth, is such that it maximizes the 
value function given by: 
( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−−−+−+−= −+−−++ )()()(
22
2
1
C
C
BeC
C
Bee
C
BV BB
C απλαπλπλλλ ααα  
where: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]μθθθθ *1*11000 111 +−⋅+−+= ff RRRWB , ( )[ ] σθθθ *11000 11 ⋅+−+= RRWC f , 
0θ  is the amount allocated in the risky asset in the first period, and 1R  is the observed 
return of the risky asset in the previous period. 
 
 Observe that the value function to be maximized is close to the one of the first 
period, but with changes in the parameters B and C, which account for the previous 
period outcome (gain or loss). As we are interested in the investor’s risk taking behavior 
after realizing a gain or a loss, let us evaluate the values of 1θ  when we change the total 
return obtained in the first period. Recall that the total return from t = 0 to t = 1 ( 1Rtot ), 
depends both on his allocation choice in t = 0 and on the realized return of the risky 
asset 1R . 
1
*
0
*
01 )1( RRRtot f θθ +−=  
Let us then, evaluate *1θ  considering the realized return of the stock in the first 
period varying over the following range: σμσμ 22 1 +<<− R . We present numerical 
results for the optimal allocation of wealth, *1θ , at t = 1. The remaining parameters are 
fixed (μ = 7.61%, σ = 12.98, α = 3, 10 =W , −λ = 2.25 and +λ = 1). Figure 12 shows the 
results. Recall that the optimal allocation in the risky asset for the first period, 
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considering the previous parameters, is 81%. Thus, we need to verify whether the 
allocation in the stock in the second period is greater or lower than 81%, indicating 
greater or lower risk appetite, respectively. First, observe that, for a total return in the 
first period equal to zero (no gains/losses), the situation replicates the same framework 
the investor faced in the first period. Then we reach the same optimal allocation in the 
risky asset (for 01 =Rtot  implies *1θ  = 81%). 
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Figure 12 –Optimal equity allocation in the second period as function of the total return obtained in 
the first period. 
 Consider the surroundings of the net value ( 01 =Rtot ). If the investor 
experiences a gain in the first period, the model predicts that he should optimally invest 
less in the risky asset in the second period. This behavior prevails up to the point where 
the loss aversion effect is less pronounced. On the other hand, if a loss is observed in the 
first period, he should take more risk in the following period, allocating a greater part of 
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his wealth in the stock. This prediction is in line with several experiments, which have 
shown that disposition effect dominates house-money in dynamic settings (Weber and 
Zuchel 2003). When the investor experiences a gain in the first period, he tends to 
reduce his risk appetite in order to guarantee the previous outcome. On the other hand, 
if he experiences a loss in the first period, he will increase his bets on stocks, trying to 
avoid the previous loss. In the model, the pattern holds for the whole gain domain; 
however, in the loss domain, high losses in the first period induce less risk appetite in 
the second period. The intuition is that if the investor is facing a huge loss, the loss 
aversion effect will dominate the risk seeking behavior, inducing a reduction in the 
optimal allocation in the stocks.  
 When we evaluate the expected cost (Eq. 10) of the behavioral inefficiency in 
the second period as a function of the return of the risky asset in the first period (Figure 
13), it is possible to observe that, depending on the previous outcome, the cost can be 
increasing or decreasing. If the value for 1R  is such that it implies a small loss in the 
first period, the cost is even negative, which means that the expected return in the 
second period under prospect theory is greater than the one associated with standard 
utility. This is related to a greater risk appetite of the prospect theory individual after a 
loss, implying a greater allocation in the stock, which has a greater expected return. If 
1R  indicates a gain in the first period, then the cost is positive once the allocation in the 
stock for the standard utility investor is greater than for the prospect utility individual.  
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Figure 13 –Expected cost in the second period as function of the equity return obtained in the first 
period. 
 We can conclude that for losses in the first period, the optimal allocation should 
adapt to the individual’s biases to reach better performance as the cost comes out to be 
negative in this domain. For gains in the previous outcome, the allocation should 
moderate the biases (observe a positive value for the expected cost). For extreme losses 
in the first period, the allocation should also moderate the investor’s biases. 
 If we accumulate the cost results in periods 1 and 2, we get the graph 
represented in Figure 14. It indicates that, for a negative stock result in the first period, 
or even a slightly positive one, the prospect theory individual outperforms the standard 
utility investor. And so, the allocation strategy should be adapted to the individual 
biases. The previous results should be taken with care as they refer to expected values. 
In section 3, we provide a more robust comparison, taking into account the performance 
of those individuals in an out-of-sample analysis. 
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Figure 14 –Expected cumulative cost in the second period as function of the equity return obtained 
in the first period. 
 
4.2.3 Multi-Period Analysis 
 If we extend the two-period analysis to a multi-period one, by analogy, if the 
investor considers his current wealth as the reference to which he measures his 
gains/losses, he will solve the same maximization problem for each period and the 
optimal asset allocation is given as in proposition 1. In this situation, the agent acts 
myopically, just considering the following period possible gain/loss. In general, this 
result implies a smaller stock allocation if compared to a standard utility investor, 
generating an expected cost associated to the prospect theory biases.   
 On the other hand, if the individual’s reference point is his initial wealth (or his 
wealth in some moment in time t = t1), the allocation is defined as in proposition 3, but 
now considering the previous outcome as the total return obtained by him from t = 0 (or 
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from t = t1) to the current time. As discussed in the two-period model, the allocation in 
the risky asset will depend on the previous gains/losses, and can be greater or smaller 
than the one chosen by the standard utility investor. Observe that the standard utility 
investor always chooses the same allocation in the risky asset, no matter what the 
reference point, as neither his decisions nor his beliefs are affected by previous 
outcomes. 
4.2.4 Resampling 
 In sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 we already evaluated the optimal asset 
allocation under prospect theory preferences and considering mental accounting, loss 
aversion, asymmetric risk taking behavior, and probability weighting. However, there is 
still an important issue in portfolio optimization missing: estimation error. Up to now, 
when solving the investor’s problem, we considered the expected return known with 
certainty, which is not the case in reality (especially in emerging markets where the 
uncertainty is higher). The assumed return for the risky asset is just an estimate, and so 
the real value can be different. This problem is relevant in any model of portfolio 
optimization and is crucial under prospect theory, where for lower values of the risk-
free rate, a slightly increase in the risk premium of stocks can lead to extreme 
allocations. If the real return of the risky asset is lower, the likelihood of facing a loss is 
greater and should significantly reduce the value of that prospect. 
 In an attempt to overcome this estimation problem, Michaud (1998) proposed 
the resampling technique. Portfolio sampling allows an analyst to visualize the 
estimation error in traditional portfolio optimization methods. Suppose that we 
estimated both the variance and the excess return by using N observations. It is 
important to note that the point estimates are random variables and so another sample of 
the same size from the same distribution would result in different estimates.  
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 Sherer (2002) suggests that sampling from a multivariate normal distribution (a 
parametric method termed Monte Carlo simulation) is a way to capture the estimation 
error. In this sense, return and variance would just be the expected values for a 
multivariate normal distribution. If we just consider two assets, the probability density 
function for a multivariate normal distribution would be given by 
. 
By repeating the sampling procedure n times, we get n new sets of optimization 
inputs, and then a different efficient allocation. The resampled weight for a portfolio 
would then be given by 
∑
=
=
n
in 1
Resamp 1
iθθ  
 The resampled portfolios should reflect a greater diversification (more assets 
enter in the solution) than the classical mean-variance efficient portfolio, and should 
also exhibit less sudden shifts (smooth transitions) in allocations as return requirements 
change. Both characteristics are desirable for investors.  
Recent literature has shown unambiguous results in favor of resampled 
portfolios in out of sample analysis (Pawley, 2005; Markowitz and Usmen, 2003; Wolf, 
2006; Jiao, 2003). However, Harvey et al. (2006), evaluating Bayes vs. resampling 
methods, posit that the choice of risk aversion drives the results. Kohli (2005) concludes 
that, despite the fact that there are no conclusive advantages or disadvantages of using 
resampling as a technique to obtain better returns, resampled portfolios do seem to offer 
higher stability and lower transaction costs, two crucial features for long term investors’ 
choices. 
 We then propose the BRATE (Behavior Resampling Technique) as a novel 
methodology to define asset allocation, which incorporates behavioral ideas and 
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resampling techniques into portfolio optimization, thus adapting to the individual’s 
preferences. In this case, the optimal asset allocation should be given by the previous 
propositions (1 and 2 or 3, depending on the reference point), but the procedure should 
be performed several times for different expected stock returns (given by a multivariate 
normal distribution). The population allocation is then given by the expected risky asset 
allocation. The procedure can be summarized as follows43: 
 
Step 1: Estimate variance-covariance and return from the historical inputs. 
Step 2: Resample from inputs (created in Step 1) by taking n draws from the 
input distribution. The number of draws reflects the degree of uncertainty in 
the inputs. Calculate new variance-covariance and return from sampled 
series. Estimation error will result in estimations that are different from 
those obtained in Step 1. 
Step 3: Calculate the optimal allocation for inputs defined in Step 2, using 
the appropriate propositions (1 and 2 or 3, depending on the reference point 
considered). 
Step 4: After repeating Steps 2 and 3 many times, calculate average 
portfolio weights.  This is the BRATE portfolio allocation. 
 
 In the next section, we provide an empirical analysis comparing the BRATE 
allocation performance to a standard utility allocation. 
 
4.3.  Empirical Study 
 
                                                 
43 This methodology is an adaptation of the one proposed in Michaud (1998). 
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4. 3. 1. Data and Implementation 
 Our tests are based considering daily data from 26 countries’ MSCI stock 
indices and risk free rates, plus the MSCI World Index, for the period from April 4th, 
1995 to January 5th, 2007. Developed countries and emerging markets (Brazil, Chile, 
South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey) were included in the analysis in 
order to find generalizable results. The total return time series are calculated on each 
country’s currency and also in US-Dollars. Thus, we are considering both hedged and 
unhedged investors. Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of each market 
considered, for the whole sample period.  
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
This Table provides descriptive statistics for the sample of world markets. For each market we present, 
the average risk free rate, the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of stock returns, as well as 
the Sharpe index (annualized values). The values are presented in the countries’ currency and also in 
USD. The risk free rate used to calculate the Sharpe Index in USD is the 3 month UST Bill rate for all 
markets. 
Risk Free Mean Std. Skew Kurt Sharpe Index Mean Std. Skew Kurt Sharpe Index
T-Bill 3 month 2.722 2.722 0.076 -0.574 1.787 0.000 2.722 0.076 -0.574 1.787 0.000
'Australia' 3.856 8.971 13.022 -0.322 6.685 0.392 10.105 17.275 -0.125 6.389 0.428
'Austria' 1.537 11.844 15.790 -0.574 7.277 0.652 12.020 17.816 -0.319 5.626 0.522
'Belgium' 2.218 10.811 18.065 0.317 9.921 0.476 10.886 19.295 0.163 7.275 0.423
'Brazil' 16.531 23.184 30.022 0.972 23.667 0.222 17.590 34.552 0.035 8.387 0.430
'Canada' 2.722 11.516 16.686 -0.426 8.866 0.527 13.230 18.337 -0.532 8.046 0.573
'Chile' 2.470 7.636 15.309 0.166 7.188 0.337 5.670 18.370 -0.067 6.509 0.161
'Denmark' 2.218 14.767 17.256 -0.321 5.778 0.727 14.540 17.973 -0.281 5.292 0.657
'Finland' 2.293 21.269 37.629 -0.162 9.041 0.504 21.118 37.650 -0.101 9.202 0.488
'France' 2.243 11.516 20.800 -0.048 5.926 0.447 11.416 21.048 -0.012 5.332 0.413
'Germany' 2.772 10.987 23.172 -0.138 6.244 0.355 10.861 23.232 -0.097 5.337 0.350
'Ireland' 2.848 10.282 17.956 -0.528 8.877 0.414 10.458 19.676 -0.304 6.763 0.392
'Italy' 2.974 10.710 20.213 -0.064 6.000 0.383 10.660 20.726 -0.032 5.237 0.383
'Japan' 0.151 4.536 19.215 0.051 5.152 0.229 2.570 22.234 0.332 6.647 -0.008
'Netherlands' 2.092 10.156 21.489 -0.076 7.018 0.375 10.004 21.551 -0.006 6.177 0.338
'Norway' 3.326 12.121 19.635 -0.304 6.706 0.449 12.172 20.767 -0.318 7.104 0.454
'Portugal' 2.923 9.727 15.801 -0.261 8.097 0.430 9.878 17.664 -0.051 5.834 0.405
'SouthAfrica' 7.938 12.625 19.769 -0.437 9.002 0.237 8.039 24.810 -0.429 7.053 0.214
'SouthKorea' 2.318 12.676 34.524 0.271 6.664 0.300 13.709 41.728 1.336 26.151 0.263
'Spain' 2.797 16.405 21.118 -0.078 6.249 0.644 16.405 21.781 0.031 5.682 0.628
'Sweden' 2.696 15.473 24.896 0.187 6.700 0.513 16.380 26.850 0.120 6.322 0.509
'Switzerland' 1.058 12.197 18.051 -0.106 7.639 0.617 11.441 17.713 0.010 6.549 0.492
'Taiwan' 3.251 4.687 26.244 0.149 5.442 0.054 3.150 27.563 0.110 5.505 0.016
'Thailand' 3.654 0.076 32.851 1.415 17.779 -0.109 -1.865 36.002 0.984 13.281 -0.128
'Turkey' 39.514 47.804 45.171 0.324 8.017 0.184 21.521 50.887 0.219 8.094 0.369
UnitedKingdom' 3.704 6.779 16.476 -0.153 6.225 0.187 8.392 17.037 -0.100 5.213 0.332
'UnitedStates' 2.722 9.904 16.978 -0.024 6.598 0.422 9.904 16.978 -0.024 6.598 0.422
World Index 2.722 7.610 12.976 -0.144 5.763 0.376 7.610 12.976 -0.144 5.763 0.376
Currency USD
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 From the table, we verify a risk premium associated with the stock market, both 
considering the values in each country’s currency and in USD, with the mean return of 
stocks being higher than the one of the corresponding riskfree rate44.  
Let us first consider the values in each country’s currency. The average 
annualized return of the risk free rate varied from 0.151% (Japan) to 39.514% (Turkey), 
while for the stock index, it ranges from 0.076% (Thailand) to 47.804% (Turkey). The 
annualized volatility (standard deviation) of the stock market varied from 12.976% 
(World Index) to 45.171% (Turkey). As expected, emerging markets tend to be more 
volatile than developed markets. While in Brazil, South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey 
the volatility was above 30 %, in countries like United Kingdom and United States, its 
value was close to 16%. In terms of skewness and kurtosis, usual results appear, 
indicating that daily stock index returns are negative skewed and have excess kurtosis 
(greater than 3). Finally, Table 1 presents the annualized Sharpe Index, which was 
greater in developed markets (around 0.35) than emerging markets (0.19). Our results 
are in line with previous literature (Mehra, 2003) which gives 0.34 as an estimation of 
the long-term Sharpe Ratio for the U.S. economy. 
When we consider the values in USD, say in the perspective of a US based 
international investor who doesn’t currency hedge his investments, we find similar 
results. The average daily return in USD is close to the one in the country’s currency, 
which is evidence of the mean reverting aspect of the foreign exchange market. 
However, the standard deviation in USD is slightly greater than the one in the country’s 
currency, as the former includes both stock market risk and currency risk (the volatility 
of the foreign exchange rate). In terms of skewness and kurtosis, the previous results 
remain. However, now the Sharpe Indexes do not present relevant differences among 
                                                 
44 The only exception is Thailand where the sharpe index is negative (-0.109). 
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emerging and developed markets (for instance it is 0.430 for Brazil and 0.422 for the 
United States). Thus it seems that emerging stock markets are less interesting for 
domestic investors than for foreign unhedged investors. 
 Next we analyze the performance of the following optimization strategies: an 
investor with a standard utility preference - STU; an investor with prospect utility 
preference, with reference point given by his current wealth – PTU; an investor with 
prospect utility preference, with reference point given by his wealth in the previous 
period – CPT; an investor with a standard utility preference (resampled) – RSTU; an 
investor with prospect utility preference, with reference point given by his current 
wealth (resampled) – BRATEa; and an investor with prospect utility preference, with 
reference point given by his wealth in the previous period (resampled) – BRATEb. The 
utility function parameters are fixed (α = 3, −λ = 2.25 and +λ = 1). We vary the 
estimation period (p) in an out of sample analysis. The parameters are estimated using 
daily return observations of the past p days. We define the efficient portfolio and hold it 
for the next (e) months, then re-estimate the parameters and adjust the portfolio weights. 
To judge the financial performance of the strategies, we compute their average return 
and empirical Sharpe-Ratios.  
4. 3. 2. Results 
 The Sharpe Ratios of the different strategies are presented in Table 2 for the 
World Index and for the total period from 1995 to 2007, considering p = 6 months, 1, 2, 
and 4 years, and e varying from 2 months to 1 year. We are evaluating the different 
strategies for a US based international stock investor. The risk free rate considered was 
the 3 month T Bill. 
 
 
Chapter Four: Behavior Finance and Estimation Risk in Portfolio Optimization 
 
 113
Table 2 – Sharpe Ratios 
This Table presents the Sharpe-Ratio of the efficient portfolio generated by each estimation model. The 
Sharpe-Ratio is calculated by dividing the excess return observed by the standard deviation. 
STU PTU CPT RSTU BRATEa BRATEb
6m-2m 0.189 0.134 0.136 0.207 0.154 0.156
6m-6m 0.101 0.080 0.083 0.125 0.102 0.114
1y-6m 0.439 0.392 0.392 0.438 0.400 0.401
2y-6m 0.462 0.426 0.421 0.464 0.434 0.423
4y-6m -0.135 -0.023 -0.023 -0.122 -0.018 -0.019
1y-1y 0.413 0.347 0.389 0.420 0.354 0.393
2y-1y 0.456 0.428 0.431 0.461 0.444 0.465
4y-1y -0.206 -0.126 -0.126 -0.193 -0.114 -0.113
mean 0.215 0.207 0.213 0.225 0.219 0.227  
 In general, we can state that the resampled models offered better results for a 
short selling constrained investor. It is an expected result as resampled models take into 
account the estimation risk, generating a more diversified portfolio which tends to 
outperform in out of sample studies. The highest Sharpe ratio was reached by the 
BRATEb model for an estimation period of 2 years and evaluation period of 1 year 
(0.465). On average resampled models increase the Sharpe ratio in around 0.10, when 
compared to the deterministic ones. Also, while the (R)STU investor seems to 
outperform (R)PTU, it doesn’t happen with (R)CPT.  
 If we consider just the total return obtained by each strategy, we find the results 
presented in Table 3. In this case, it’s possible to infer an inefficiency cost related to the 
behavioral investors, who tend to underperform the results of the standard utility 
investor in around 10 bps45. However if take into account the increment in risk (a risk 
adjusted measure like Shape Ratio), the inefficiency disappears. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 1 bps = 0.01%. 
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Table 3 – Average Total Return 
This Table presents the Average Total Return of the efficient portfolio generated by each estimation 
model.  
STU PTU CPT RSTU BRATEa BRATEb
6m-2m 4.302 3.781 3.822 4.447 3.935 3.976
6m-6m 3.654 3.449 3.476 3.883 3.643 3.749
1y-6m 6.670 6.211 6.211 6.632 6.238 6.242
2y-6m 7.377 6.987 6.875 7.345 6.910 6.775
4y-6m 1.065 2.083 2.083 1.064 1.992 1.993
1y-1y 6.711 5.981 6.295 6.630 5.979 6.341
2y-1y 7.247 6.935 6.966 7.289 7.068 7.194
4y-1y 0.419 1.226 1.226 0.530 1.287 1.297
mean 4.681 4.582 4.619 4.727 4.631 4.696  
Based on the previous results, we can state that resampled models tend to 
outperform traditional models. Also, there is no clear advantage of standard utility 
investors over behavioral prospect theory investors at least to the CPT investor. Levy 
and Levy (2004) reached a similar result, positing that the practical differences between 
prospect theory and traditional mean-variance theory are minor. In this sense, 
behavioral biases should not be moderated, nor should standard models be adapted to 
include behavioral biases. 
 When we take into account each market separately, we find the results presented 
in Table 4 (in each country’s currency). Considering each country individually, there’s 
no clear dominance of a single strategy. Resampled models tend to outperform 
traditional models in emerging markets (observe the results for Brazil, Chile, South 
Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey), where the uncertainty over the 
risk/return estimation is higher.  
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Table 4 – Sharpe Ratios 
This Table presents the Sharpe-Ratio of the efficient portfolio generated considering an estimation period 
of 1 year and evaluation period of 6 months (in each country’s currency). The Sharpe-Ratio is calculated 
by dividing the excess return observed by the standard deviation. 
STU PTU CPT RSTU BRATEa BRATEb
'Australia' 0.309 0.352 0.353 0.309 0.346 0.345
'Austria' 0.629 0.578 0.584 0.618 0.593 0.597
'Belgium' 0.977 0.982 0.973 0.982 0.986 0.977
'Brazil' 0.323 0.326 0.304 0.335 0.333 0.317
'Canada' 0.490 0.490 0.490 0.490 0.488 0.489
'Chile' 0.729 0.726 0.721 0.735 0.740 0.736
'Denmark' 0.914 0.914 0.914 0.908 0.910 0.909
'Finland' 0.696 0.685 0.638 0.691 0.658 0.665
'France' 0.778 0.790 0.755 0.780 0.785 0.764
'Germany' 0.619 0.614 0.619 0.619 0.616 0.616
'Ireland' 0.615 0.607 0.636 0.626 0.607 0.634
'Italy' 0.737 0.769 0.740 0.733 0.753 0.726
'Japan' 0.041 0.080 0.042 0.057 0.051 0.040
'Netherlands' 0.657 0.655 0.657 0.657 0.654 0.655
'Norway' 0.389 0.368 0.368 0.402 0.398 0.398
'Portugal' 0.751 0.685 0.728 0.764 0.716 0.738
'SouthAfrica' 0.161 0.206 0.218 0.167 0.208 0.224
'SouthKorea' 0.101 0.019 0.035 0.111 0.066 0.058
'Spain' 0.932 0.949 0.954 0.930 0.936 0.936
'Sweden' 0.634 0.631 0.631 0.643 0.634 0.633
'Switzerland' 0.773 0.720 0.739 0.773 0.739 0.748
'Taiwan' -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
'Thailand' 0.041 -0.012 -0.048 0.055 0.033 0.018
'Turkey' 0.183 0.189 0.094 0.185 0.190 0.103
UnitedKingdom' 0.411 0.428 0.423 0.411 0.429 0.426
'UnitedStates' 0.618 0.624 0.626 0.615 0.623 0.616
World Index' 0.439 0.392 0.392 0.438 0.400 0.401  
 In terms of the comparison between the standard and the prospect utility 
investor, generally the former doesn’t outperform the latter, indicating no clear 
dominance of the traditional rational model. In this sense, there is no need for 
moderating the behavioral biases as described by prospect theory, as no extra financial 
efficiency is gained. 
 Generally speaking, an interesting finding is the fact that all previous allocation 
models outperform the 100% risky strategy. The Sharpe ratio of the 100% stock 
strategy was 0.383 while all resampled models reached, on average, a result above 
0.50946.  
                                                 
46 A t-test over the Sharpe Ratio differences offered a significant result with a p-value of 0.0001. 
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 Finally, if we take into account the values in USD and so considering that the 
investor is facing foreign exchange risk, we reach the results presented in Table 5.  
Table 5 – Sharpe Ratios 
This Table presents the Sharpe-Ratio of the efficient portfolio generated considering an estimation period 
of 1 year and evaluation period of 6 months (values in USD). The Sharpe-Ratio is calculated by dividing 
the excess return observed by the standard deviation. 
STU PTU CPT RSTU BRATEa BRATEb
'Australia' 0.589 0.567 0.564 0.591 0.595 0.591
'Austria' 0.896 1.015 1.015 0.882 0.971 0.977
'Belgium' 0.904 0.904 0.904 0.886 0.886 0.899
'Brazil' 0.656 0.653 0.653 0.669 0.675 0.668
'Canada' 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.423 0.420 0.420
'Chile' 0.752 0.757 0.757 0.774 0.776 0.775
'Denmark' 0.781 0.754 0.820 0.776 0.773 0.803
'Finland' 0.612 0.596 0.597 0.613 0.597 0.593
'France' 0.654 0.643 0.625 0.649 0.625 0.629
'Germany' 0.533 0.509 0.521 0.537 0.502 0.516
'Ireland' 0.654 0.593 0.600 0.641 0.620 0.618
'Italy' 0.674 0.614 0.640 0.681 0.638 0.664
'Japan' 0.195 0.181 0.194 0.198 0.175 0.182
'Netherlands' 0.645 0.655 0.656 0.645 0.653 0.654
'Norway' 0.351 0.387 0.387 0.361 0.381 0.380
'Portugal' 0.666 0.641 0.641 0.669 0.647 0.660
'SouthAfrica' 0.465 0.441 0.456 0.479 0.459 0.460
'SouthKorea' 0.226 0.222 0.189 0.233 0.230 0.191
'Spain' 0.858 0.899 0.899 0.862 0.892 0.894
'Sweden' 0.562 0.558 0.566 0.563 0.554 0.565
'Switzerland' 0.599 0.531 0.552 0.596 0.607 0.612
'Taiwan' -0.090 -0.100 -0.086 -0.083 -0.095 -0.076
'Thailand' 0.104 0.040 0.030 0.114 0.108 0.096
'Turkey' 0.288 0.250 0.238 0.296 0.267 0.246
UnitedKingdom' 0.625 0.574 0.605 0.632 0.597 0.626
'UnitedStates' 0.618 0.624 0.626 0.612 0.615 0.612
World Index' 0.439 0.392 0.392 0.438 0.400 0.401  
 Again, the results indicate a dominance of resampled models in emerging 
markets, while for developed countries, no clear dominance can be seen. The traditional 
rational model does not outperform the behavioral ones. Finally, all six dynamic models 
add value for the investor when compared to a 100% stock invested individual. Observe 
that the Sharpe Ratio found for the different markets (both in the country’s currency and 
in USD) are notably higher than the ones presented in Table 1. 
 Summing up, resampled models, which take into account estimation risk, tend to 
outperform deterministic models, notably for emerging markets where the uncertainty 
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of the expected return estimation is higher. Moreover, prospect theory utility investors 
don’t reach worse returns if compared to the traditional rational ones, which indicate no 
need for addressing bias moderation in the portfolio allocation.  
 
4. 4.  Conclusions 
 
 This study had two objectives: first to incorporate mental accounting, loss 
aversion, asymmetric risk-taking behavior, and probability weighting in portfolio 
optimization for individual investors; and second to take into account the estimation risk 
in the analysis.  
Considering daily index stock data from 26 countries over the period from 1995 
to 2007, we empirically evaluated our model (BRATE – Behavior Resample 
Technique) against the traditional Markowitz. Several estimation and evaluation periods 
were used and we also considered a foreign exchange hedged and an unhedged strategy. 
Our results support the use of BRATE as an alternative for defining optimal 
asset allocation and posit that a portfolio optimization model may be adapted to the 
individual biases implied in prospect theory. Behavioral biases don’t seem to reduce 
efficiency when we consider a dynamic setting. This result is robust for different 
developed and emerging markets. Also, the previous optimization models add value for 
the individual investor when compared to a naive 100% risky strategy. 
As further extensions of the present research, we suggest the inclusion of several 
risky assets in the analysis. In this case, the issue of multiple mental accounting is a 
crucial issue to address the problem. An investor who evaluates every security in their 
own mental account will not necessarily view additional securities as redundant, which 
dramatically increases the complexity of the problem.  
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We also leave unasked the question of how individuals arrive at the underlying 
return distribution. That is the model above is a proposed mechanism for how 
individuals might transform a given probability distribution (assumed to be an accurate 
representation of the underlying distribution) into decision weights. Once we introduce 
uncertainty, it can induce individual biases, subjectivity and error. There is evidence 
that people display considerable overconfidence when asked to provide a subjective 
assessment of a probability distribution47. Moreover, it is questionable whether the 
weightings provided by CPT truly reflect the process by which individuals evaluate 
continuous probability distributions.  
The agent who measures his gains and losses always relative to his actual wealth 
solves the same maximization problem each period, therefore selecting a fix-mix 
strategy. An open question remains, if a fix-mix strategy can be the cause of the 
disposition effect. 
 
                                                 
47 Their subjective distribution is too tightly centered on their estimated mean. 
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Chapter Five 
 
General Conclusions, Contributions and Lines for Further 
Research 
 
 In this thesis, we assumed as invariants of human behavior: loss aversion; 
asymmetric risk taking behavior; probability weighting and mental accounting. Under 
the previous theoretical framework, we evaluated three financial contexts: the role of 
incentives in risk taking decisions (Chapter 2); the effect of prior outcomes in future 
risk decisions (Chapter 3); and finally the portfolio choice problem (Chapter 4). 
Our main conclusion is that absolute evaluations based on final wealth are 
limited and the relativity of risk taking decisions, where the perception of gains or 
losses drives the process, is a requirement to understand individual’s decisions. As a 
reply to behavioral critics, we reach propositions that can be falsified and make several 
predictions. Our contributions are both on the theoretical and empirical streams of 
finance literature. 
 In Chapter 2 we formulated five propositions linking investment strategy, 
compensation and risk taking in professional investor’s context. We suggested that 
managers in passive managed funds tend to be rewarded without incentive fee and be 
Chapter Five: General Conclusions 
 
 120
risk averse. On the other hand, in active managed funds, whether incentives will reduce 
or increase the riskiness of the fund will depend on how hard is to outperform the 
benchmark. If the fund is (un)likely to outperform the benchmark, incentives (increase) 
reduce the manager’s risk appetite. Furthermore, the evaluative horizon influences the 
trader’s risk preferences, in the sense that if traders performed poorly (well) in a period, 
they tend to choose riskier (conservative) investments in the following period given the 
same evaluative horizon. We tested the model in an empirical analysis over a sample of 
4684 mutual equity funds (cross-section data), from developed and emerging markets, 
and we reached supportive results to the propositions established in the theoretical 
model.  
In Chapter 3, we performed a cross-country (Brazil and Spain) experiment on 
how prior outcomes affects risk taking decisions trying to elucidate the controversial 
result found in house-money and loss aversion papers. Our results support the existence 
of MLA over the countries but a country effect is also found, indicating that care should 
be taken when generalizing behavioral findings over the international financial market. 
No salient sex or age effect was found in the sample; however, some cultural 
differences among countries seem to have influence on the risk taking decision. 
Disposition effect is found to dominate the risk-taking behavior of subjects in dynamic 
settings, overcoming the house-money effect. Subjects that experienced a gain (loss) 
tend to assume less (more) risk in the following period.  
 Chapter 4 had two objectives: first to incorporate mental accounting, loss 
aversion, asymmetric risk-taking behavior and probability weighting in portfolio 
optimization for individual investors; and second to take into account the estimation risk 
in the analysis. Considering daily index stock data, from 26 countries for the period 
from 1995 to 2007, we empirically evaluated our model (BRATE – Behavior Resample 
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Technique) to the traditional Markowitz. Our results support the use of BRATE as an 
alternative for defining optimal asset allocation and posit that a portfolio optimization 
model should be adapted to the individual biases implied in prospect theory. Behavioral 
biases don’t seem to reduce efficiency when we consider a dynamic setting. This result 
is robust for different developed and emerging markets.  
 Several extensions to the present research can be mentioned. Overall we 
considered several invariants of human behavior based on prospect theory. However, 
the impact of cognitive biases in agent’s risk preference still needs to be better 
understood, in order to understand the way psychological states may affect risk 
preferences in this context.  
In terms of the delegated portfolio management model and the influence of 
incentives in the risk taking behavior of incentives, further research may include the 
type of financial institution the trader works for (banks, insurance companies, pension 
funds) to take into account regulatory and institutional effects. Also, delegated portfolio 
management often involves more than one layer of agency: how does this feature affect 
incentives? More generally, studies about general equilibrium implications and price 
impact of the agency aspects of professional portfolio management should be interesting 
especially for policy-makers, given the relevance of these funds in all developed 
financial market.  
Also, in the compensation analysis, only financial compensations were 
considered and we think that including non-financial rewards like recognition and 
prestige would enrich the theory and enable better predictions. Finally, inclusion of 
career concerns in the model could also improve multi-period analysis. Kempf et al. 
(2007) suggest that when employment risk is high, managers that lag behind tend to 
decrease risk relative to leading managers in order to prevent potential job loss. 
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Related to the experiment performed in Chapter 3 and the influence of prior 
outcomes in risk taking behavior, as possible extensions we suggest to go further in the 
investigation of what country's cultural characteristics are generating the effect found in 
the research, and also the use of other countries’ students replicating the experimental 
design C, since we have found that there seems to be a country effect as well, which 
could be due to cultural differences.  
Finally, related to Chapter 4 and the portfolio choice problem, as further 
extensions of the presented research, we suggest the inclusion of several risky assets in 
the analysis. In this case, the issue of multiple mental accounting is a crucial issue to 
address the problem. An investor who evaluates every security in its own mental 
account will not necessarily view additional securities as redundant. Also a deeper 
discussion of how individuals access returns’ underlying distribution is another crucial 
point which can be explored in the future. 
Summing up, as can be seen, behavioral finance is an open avenue where several 
studies are still missing. We forecast that in the following years, behavioral models will 
be the rule and not the exception, and doing so, economists will be closer to the 
complexity of social reality, and their theories will explain much better what is going on 
in financial markets. As mentioned by Thaler (2000), it is the evolution from homo 
economicus to homo sapiens. 
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Appendix A: Experiment Instructions (Chapter 3) 
(Translated from Portuguese and Spanish) 
Introduction [Read aloud only] 
 Welcome to our experimental study of decision-making. The experiment will 
last about 30 minutes. The instructions for the experiment are simple, and if you follow 
them carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. All the money you earn 
is yours to keep, and will be paid to you, privately and in cash, immediately after the 
experiment.  
 Before we start the experiment you will be asked to pick one envelope from this 
pile. In the envelope you will find your Registration Form. This form will be used to 
register your decisions and earnings. On the top of your Registration Form you will find 
your registration number. This number indicates behind which table you are to take a 
seat. When everyone is seated, we will go through the instructions of the experiment. 
After that, you will have the opportunity to study the instructions on your own, and to 
ask questions. If you have a question, please raise your hand, and I will come to your 
table. Please do not talk or communicate with the other participants during the 
experiment. 
 Are there any questions about what has been said until now? If not, then will the 
person on my left please be the first to pick an envelope, open it, and take the 
corresponding seat. 
[Treatment F: Read aloud and distributed] 
 The experiment consists of 12 successive rounds. In each round you will start 
with an amount of 100 cents. You must decide which part of this amount (between 0 
cents and 100 cents) you wish to bet in the following lottery. 
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You have a chance of 2/3 (67%) to lose the amount you bet and a chance of 1/3 (33%) 
to win two and a half times the amount bet. 
 You are requested to record your choice on the Registration Form. Suppose that 
you decide to bet an amount of X cents (0 ≤ X ≤ 100) in the lottery. Then you must fill 
in the amount X in the column headed Amount in lottery, in the row with the number of 
the present round. 
 Whether you win or lose in the lottery depends on your personal win color. This 
color is indicated on the top of your Registration Form. Your win color can be Red, 
Yellow or Green, and is the same for all twelve rounds. In any round, you win in the 
lottery if your win color matches the round color that will be randomly selected and 
announced, and you lose if your win color does not match the round color. 
 The round color is determined as follows. After you have recorded your bet in 
the lottery for the round, the computer will randomly select one color that will be shown 
in the screen. If the round color matches your win color, you win in the lottery; 
otherwise you lose. Since there are three colors, one of which matches your win color, 
the chance of winning in the lottery is 1/3 (33%) and the chance of losing is 2/3 (67%). 
 Hence, your earnings in the lottery are determined as follows. If you have 
decided to put an amount X cents in the lottery, then your earnings in the lottery for the 
round are equal to - X if the round color does not match your win color (you lose the 
amount bet), and equal to (2.5X) if the round color matches your win color. 
 The round color will be shown in the screen and announced by the assistant. You 
need to record this color in the column Round color, under win or lose, depending on 
whether the round color does or does not match your win color. Also, you need to 
record your earnings in the lottery in the column Earnings in lottery. Your total earnings 
for the round are equal to 100 cents (your starting amount) plus your earnings in the 
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lottery. These earnings are recorded in the column Total Earnings, in the row of the 
corresponding round. Each time we will come by to check your Registration Form. 
 After that, you are requested to record your choice for the next round. Again you 
start with an amount of 100 cents, a part of which you can bet in the lottery. The same 
procedure as described above determines your earnings for this round. It is noted that 
your private win color remains the same, but that for each round the computer selects a 
new color randomly. All subsequent rounds will also proceed in the same manner. After 
the last round has been completed, your earnings in all rounds will be totaled. This 
amount determines your total earnings in the experiment, which you will receive in cash 
after the numbers are checked. 
 [Treatment I: Read aloud and distributed] 
 The experiment consists of 12 successive rounds. In each round you will start 
with an amount of 100 cents. You must decide which part of this amount (between 0 
cents and 100 cents) you wish to bet in the following lottery. 
You have a chance of 2/3 (67%) to lose the amount you bet and a chance of 1/3 (33%) 
to win two and a half times the amount bet. 
 You are requested to record your choice on the Registration Form. Suppose that 
you decide to bet an amount of X cents (0 ≤ X ≤ 100) in the lottery. Then you must fill 
in the amount X in the column headed Amount in lottery. Please note that you fix your 
bet for the next three rounds. Thus, if you decide to bet an amount X in the lottery for 
round 1, then you also bet an amount X in the lottery for rounds 2 and 3. Therefore, 
three consecutive rounds are joined together on the Registration Form. 
 Whether you win or lose in the lottery depends on your personal win color. This 
color is indicated on the top of your Registration Form. Your win color can be Red, 
Yellow or Green, and is the same for all twelve rounds. In any round, you win in the 
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lottery if your win color matches the round color that will be randomly selected and 
announced, and you lose if your win color does not match the round color. 
 The round color is determined as follows. After you have recorded your bet in 
the lottery for the next three rounds, the computer will randomly select one color that 
will be shown in the screen for each of the next three rounds. If the round color matches 
your win color, you win in the lottery; otherwise you lose. Since there are three colors, 
one of which matches your win color, the chance of winning in the lottery is 1/3 (33%) 
and the chance of losing is 2/3 (67%). 
 Hence, your earnings in the lottery for the three rounds are determined as 
follows. If you have decided to put an amount X cents in the lottery, then your earnings 
in the lottery for the round are equal to - X if the round color does not match your win 
color (you lose the amount bet), and equal to (2.5X) if the round color matches your win 
color. 
 The three round colors will be shown in the screen and announced by the 
assistant. You need to record this color in the column Round color, under win or lose, 
depending on whether the round color does or does not match your win color. Also, you 
need to record your earnings in the lottery in the column Earnings in lottery. Your total 
earnings for the three rounds are equal to 300 cents (your starting amount) plus your 
earnings in the lottery. These earnings are recorded in the column Total Earnings, in the 
row of the corresponding round. Each time we will come by to check your Registration 
Form. 
 After that, you are requested to record your choice for the next three rounds (4-
6). For each of the three rounds you again start with an amount of 100 cents, a part of 
which you can bet in the lottery. The same procedure as described above determines 
your earnings for these three rounds. It is noted that your private win color remains the 
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same, but that for each round the computer selects a new color randomly. All 
subsequent rounds will also proceed in the same manner, also grouped by three (i.e., 7-9 
and 10-12). After the last round has been completed, your earnings in all rounds will be 
totaled. This amount determines your total earnings in the experiment, which you will 
receive in cash after the numbers being checked. 
[Treatment C: Read aloud and distributed] 
 The experiment consists of 12 successive rounds. In each odd round (1, 3, 5, 7, 9 
and 11) you will start with an amount of 100 cents. In each even round (2, 4, 6, 8, 10 
and 12) you will start with an amount of 100 cents plus your Total Earnings in the 
previous round. You must decide which part of this amount (between 0 cents and 100 
cents for odd rounds; and between 0 cents and 100 cents plus your Total Earnings in the 
previous round for even rounds) you wish to bet in the following lottery. 
You have a chance of 2/3 (67%) to lose the amount you bet and a chance of 1/3 (33%) 
to win two and a half times the amount bet. 
 You are requested to record your choice on the Registration Form. Suppose that 
you decide to bet an amount of X cents in the lottery. Then you must fill in the amount 
X in the column headed Amount in lottery, in the row with the number of the present 
round. 
 Whether you win or lose in the lottery depends on your personal win color. This 
color is indicated on the top of your Registration Form. Your win color can be Red, 
Yellow or Green, and is the same for all twelve rounds. In any round, you win in the 
lottery if your win color matches the round color that randomly selected and 
announced, and you lose if your win color does not match the round color. 
 The round color is determined as follows. After you have recorded your bet in 
the lottery for the round, the computer will randomly select one color that will be shown 
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in the screen. If the round color matches your win color, you win in the lottery; 
otherwise you lose. Since there are three colors, one of which matches your win color, 
the chance of winning in the lottery is 1/3 (33%) and the chance of losing is 2/3 (67%). 
 Hence, your earnings in the lottery are determined as follows. If you have 
decided to put an amount X cents in the lottery, then your earnings in the lottery for the 
round are equal to - X if the round color does not match your win color (you lose the 
amount bet), and equal to (2.5X) if the round color matches your win color. 
 The round color will be shown in the screen and announced by the assistant. You 
need to record this color in the column Round color, under win or lose, depending on 
whether the round color does or does not match your win color. Also, you need to 
record your earnings in the lottery in the column Earnings in lottery. Your total earnings 
for the round are equal to 100 cents in odd rounds; or 100 cents plus your Total 
Earnings in the previous round for even rounds (your starting amount); plus your 
earnings in the lottery. These earnings are recorded in the column Total Earnings, in the 
row of the corresponding round. Each time we will come by to check your Registration 
Form. 
 After that, you are requested to record your choice for the next round. Again, 
you start with an amount of 100 cents in odd rounds or 100 cents plus your Total 
Earnings in the previous round for even rounds, a part of which you can bet in the 
lottery. The same procedure as described above determines your earnings for this round. 
It is noted that your private win color remains the same, but that for each round the 
computer selects a new color randomly. All subsequent rounds will also proceed in the 
same manner. After the last round has been completed, your earnings in all rounds will 
be totaled. This amount determines your total earnings in the experiment, which you 
will receive in cash after the numbers being checked. 
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        Win Color: RED 
REGISTRATION FORM 
(Treatment F) 
Name: ________________________________________________________________ 
Date: ___/___/______ Gender: Male / Female        Age: ____ 
University: __________________________  Country: ______________ 
Course: _____________________________ 
Answer the following questions: 
1) You have just won $30. Choose between: 
(a) A 50% chance to gain $9 and a 50% chance to lose $9 
(b) No further gain or loss 
2) You have just lost $30. Choose between: 
(a) A 50% chance to gain $9 and a 50% chance to lose $9 
(b) No further gain or loss 
Round Amount 
in 
Lottery  
Round 
Color 
Win Lose Earnings 
in 
Lottery 
Total 
Earnings 
0 (test)   Win Lose   
1   Win Lose   
2   Win Lose   
3   Win Lose   
4   Win Lose   
5   Win Lose   
6   Win Lose   
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7   Win Lose   
8   Win Lose   
9   Win Lose   
10   Win Lose   
11   Win Lose   
12   Win Lose   
Total       
 
Recall: 
Amount in Lottery (X): must be between 0 (zero) and 100 (one hundred) cents. 
Round Color: write the color randomly selected for that round. 
Win / Lose: check the corresponding box depending on if you won or lost that round. 
Earnings in Lottery: equals (-X) if you lost and equals (2.5 X) if you won. 
Total Earnings: equals 100 plus Earnings in Lottery. 
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        Win Color: RED 
REGISTRATION FORM 
(Treatment I) 
Name: ________________________________________________________________ 
Date: ___/___/______ Gender: Male / Female        Age: ____ 
University: __________________________  Country: ______________ 
Course: _____________________________ 
Answer the following questions: 
1) You have just won $30. Choose between: 
(a) A 50% chance to gain $9 and a 50% chance to lose $9 
(b) No further gain or loss 
2) You have just lost $30. Choose between: 
(a) A 50% chance to gain $9 and a 50% chance to lose $9 
(b) No further gain or loss 
Round Amount 
in 
Lottery  
Round 
Color 
Win Lose Earnings 
in 
Lottery 
Total 
Earnings 
0 (test)   Win Lose   
1   Win Lose   
2   Win Lose   
3   Win Lose   
4   Win Lose   
5   Win Lose   
6   Win Lose   
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7   Win Lose   
8   Win Lose   
9   Win Lose   
10   Win Lose   
11   Win Lose   
12   Win Lose   
Total       
 
Recall: 
Amount in Lottery (X): must be between 0 (zero) and 100 (one hundred) cents and it 
must be the same in the following 3 rounds. 
Round Color: write the color randomly selected for that round. 
Win / Lose: check the corresponding box depending on if you won or lost that round. 
Earnings in Lottery: equals (-X) if you lost and equals (2.5 X) if you won. 
Total Earnings: equals 100 plus Earnings in Lottery. 
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        Win Color: RED 
REGISTRATION FORM 
(Treatment C) 
Name: ________________________________________________________________ 
Date: ___/___/______ Gender: Male / Female        Age: ____ 
University: __________________________  Country: ______________ 
Course: _____________________________ 
Answer the following questions: 
1) You have just won $30. Choose between: 
(a) A 50% chance to gain $9 and a 50% chance to lose $9 
(b) No further gain or loss 
2) You have just lost $30. Choose between: 
(a) A 50% chance to gain $9 and a 50% chance to lose $9 
(b) No further gain or loss 
Round Amount 
in 
Lottery  
Round 
Color 
Win Lose Earnings 
in 
Lottery 
Total 
Earnings 
0 (test)   Win Lose   
1   Win Lose   
2   Win Lose   
3   Win Lose   
4   Win Lose   
5   Win Lose   
6   Win Lose   
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7   Win Lose   
8   Win Lose   
9   Win Lose   
10   Win Lose   
11   Win Lose   
12   Win Lose   
Total       
 
Recall: 
Amount in Lottery (X): must decide between 0 cents and 100 cents for odd rounds (1, 
3, 5, 7, 9); and between 0 cents and 100 cents plus your Total Earnings in the previous 
round for even rounds (2, 4, 6, 8, 10)  
Round Color: write the color randomly selected for that round. 
Win / Lose: check the corresponding box depending on if you won or lost that round. 
Earnings in Lottery: equals (-X) if you lost and equals (2.5 X) if you won. 
Total Earnings: equals 100 plus Earnings in Lottery for odd rounds (1, 3, 5, 7, 9); and 
equals Total Earnings in the previous round plus Earnings in Lottery for even rounds 
(2, 4, 6, 8, 10). 
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We want to prove that the following property hold: 
i) 0>∂
∂
μ
V ; 
The partial derivative of V (Eq. 06) is given by: 
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Now, let’s proove properties (ii) and (iii) 
ii) 0=∂
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0 σμσθσμ σμθθασθα ∂= +−−−−− fReef for σ > 0. We show 
that  0),( <σμf . 
Suppose that for some *μ and  0*)( >μσ ,  0*))(,( >μσμf . Since  ),( ⋅μf is continuous, 
( )[ ] 0e ),(lim 00120 <−= +−−+→ μθθασ λσμ fRf  and 0),(lim =∞→ σμσ f  for all μ > 0, we can 
assume without loss of generality that  0*)( >μσ  is a local maxima of  )*,( ⋅μf . We 
compute the partial derivative of f  with respect to σ. We have 
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minimum. This contradicts the existence of *μ  and *)(μσ  local maxima of )*,( ⋅μf  
such that 0*))(*,( >μσμf . Hence, 0),( <σμf  and therefore 0),( <∂ σμσV . 
Also, 
0),(lim =∂∞→ σμσσ f  for 0>μ  since 
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